For the New PM of SOMALIA:Lessons from a recent Past. Part 1..Wait and see

                   Saturday(21-!2-2013) the Somali federal  Parliament accepted the nomination by President Hassan Sheik to the post of new PM of Mr.Abdiweli.Sheik Ahmed. The vote verged on unanimity by all sides-groups-within the Somali federal parliament.It was 186 the yes vote, the N0 vote were just 2 and abstention just mere 2 votes. .At most  very few times a new PM  has been endorsed by this kind of overwhelming majority.Why this time? What are the lessons from the first government of President  Hassan Sheik and PM Abdi  Farah Shirdoon? How it weathered down its first big crisis the Presidency of Hassan Sheik who was  elected in September 2012? Who is the Head of government and the Head of the State according to the Constitution? What were the major obstacles in the tenure of the PM Abdi Farah Shirdon? Why Damu Jadid  the pro-Salafist group has ousted former PM Shirdoon just one year in Office?
        Let me first start by saying the CV of Mr. Abdiweli Sheik Ahmed PM elect  is overwhelming when it came to experiences in the Consultancy sector/private sector but he has not any meaningful experience in the Somali murky, conspiratorial, Clan based politics and in part crime based.. ( The last casualty of this criminality instigated by some members who are themselves Drug- Barons and bosses to organized crimes is MR."Faisal" an MP who dared to challenge them and was spokesman for the Shirdoon side during the Dispute between the president and PM Shirdoon).Maybe this will be an advantage if he can restrain in joining any group of the two main groups of the Clan- based Nationalist and the Clan based Puppet Leaders linked to ETHIOPIA-IGAD allied to Salafist Business Cartels/ Organized Crimes/Damu/Jadid..He can claim that he is technocrat who will follow the Constitution and the Agenda set by the President. Any way I don't see any Change unless he asserts himself and the international community asserts themselves.At the end they are the ones paying AMISOM and for the reestablishment of a Somali viable state in  the HORN of Africa.
        The main political  actors in the Somali context- I mean in the parliament and in general- are the ones I said above and unfortunately the President in this days is full time member of the group I called the Damu Jadid a pro-Salafist side who for Machiavellian  reasons of power and finance is allied with the ETHIOPIA-IGAD States. To be fair the group of the Clan based Puppet Leaders/ pro- Salafist members  allied to the Salafist Business cartels/Organized Crimes/Drug cartels  has  the Majority-almost 200  out of 275 members parliamentarians combined group in the parliament- and running the federal  administration and security services in Mogadishu. They  needed  an outsider like Mr Abdiweli  the new PM  to cover up their  own Agenda and manipulate the International Community/Donor Agencies/EU/Arab-Muslim world/UN,US and UK. The rest of the members  of the parliament are 75 and at least we can find what I call the Clan based Nationalist number not more of 65 to 70. This group which is in the minority in the parliament( but enjoys the real support of the silent  majority of Somali people-citizens and international community except the ETHIOPIA-IGAD GROUP) is the one who sided with the last PM Abdi Farah Shirdoon in the last vote of no confidence in which he was ousted by the combined alliance of the pro-salafist Damu Jadid,Salafist Cartels representative linked parliamentarians and the Clan based Puppet leaders allied to ETHIOPIA-IGAD..
        The real powers in the so-called Somali state are the Somali Elites Puppet Leaders which are the majority in the Federal parliament.They have been selected from the Nairobi conference of 2004 by Ethiopia and IGAD countries and been reselected in the last Conference of 2012. They are individuals who are corrupt and immoral for their  political beliefs but Loyal to their masters the ETHIOPIAN government and some IGAD countries.The two precess I am mentioning above were both controlled and manipulated by the Ethiopian intelligence and the last one Mr. GABRE a Tigre general who works for IGAD was overseeing all is done in their interest.More to that  MR. GABRE is well know in Somali Elite political/Business Salafist  circles why he was the  Political Commissar czar of The ETHIOPIAN ARMY who occupied  the south of Somalia in 2006-2009. That occupation/invasion was sanctioned by the international community in the naive belief the Ethiopians were fighting Al-Shabaab and not  trying to colonize SOMALIA. In that way we have in Somalia a parliament which is controlled by Foreign powers and only for a few times has stood for the interest of the Somali people-citizens.But all is not rigid and when some times things become emotional, national and  there is real  involvement of the Somali citizens as One community the Salafist and Puppet leaders  are beaten at their own game like the time of former PM Mr. Formajo and  some  times  in the government of Shirdoon.The other  two groups are the Clan based  pro-salafist members of parliament which are small but allied with the puppet parliamentarians. The third is the what I call the Clan based Nationalist which as numbers cams  second but does not have any political influence unless there is time of crises specially of matters of national importance.
(To be continued)
        

The True Agenda of the Rulers of Kismayo,Jubba Regions.Wait and see.

Wareegto kasoo baxday Xafiiska hoggaamiyaha Jubba oo lagu magacaabay Ciidamo la Wareegaya Amniga Kismaayo [SAWIRRO]

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Khamiis, December 05, 2013(HOL) :- Xilli mudooyinkii u danbeeyay ay magaalada Kismaayo ka dhacayeen falal liddi ku ah ammaanka, ayaa wareegto kasoo baxday xafiiska madaxweeynaha maamulka Jubba Sheekh Axmed Max'ed Islaam (Axmed Madoobe) ayaa lagu amray guutada 94-aad ee ciidamada maamulka in maanta wixii ka danbeeyay ay masuul ka yihiin amniga magaalada Kismaayo. Wareegtadan ayaa waxa warbaahinta u aqriyay Jen. Cabdi Madoobe oo kamid ah saraakiisha maamulka Jubba, wuxuuna kula dardaarmay ciidamada iyo saraakiishooda in ay sugaan amniga magaalada, isalamrkaana ay ka hortagaan wax walba oo dhibaato u keeni kara shacabka iyo hantidooda.

"Maanta wixii ka danbeeyo adinka ayaa masuul ka ah ammanka magaalada Kismaayo, waxaa la idinka doonayaan in cadowga iyo naftiinaba aad ka ilaalisaan hantida shacabka, waxaa la doonayaa in aad tallaabo ka qaadaan cid walba oo aad u aragtaan in ay qatar ku tahay nabadgelyada," ayuu masuulkan hadalkiisii raaciyay.
Jen. Cabdi Madoobe ayaa dhinaca kale sheegay in maanta wixii ka danbeeyo aan la arki karin askari hub ku dhex wata Kismaayo oo aan ka ahayn ciidamadan cusub ee loo xilsaaray ammaanka, wuxuuna amar ku siiyaan saraakiisha ciidamadan in ay gacanta kusoo dhigaan askarigii ay arkaan isagoo hub sharci darro ah ku dhex wata magaalada.
Sidoo kale goobta waxaa ka hadlay Mustaf Cabdi Sheekh Cali oo kamid ah saraakiisha nabadsugidda maamulka Jubba, wuxuuna xusay in ay soo dhaweynayaan ciidamadan cusub ee la wareegi doona ammaanka islamarkaana ay la shaqeyn doonaan, wuxuuna ugu baaqay shacabka in ay gacan ku siiyaan ilaalinta nabadgelyada.

Digreetadan kasoo baxday xafiiska madaxweeynaha maamulka Jubba ayaa kusoo beegmeysa xilli xarunta madaxtooyada Kismaayo ay ka soconayaan shirar iyo tashiyo ku aadan guddi fulin oo lagu wado in hogaamiyaha maamulka Jubba uu dhawaan ku dhawaaqo, kuwaasoo sii wadi doona howlaha maamulka inta laga dhameystirayo golayaasha ka dhiman maamulka.


Xasan Nuur, Hiiraan Onlinehnur@hiiraan.com
Kismaayo-Soomaaliya.


 Here in this document you will see how the So- called Agreement of Addis-Ababa between the Somali Federal government and the regional Authority of Jubba regions being misinterpreted by the so- called Ruler of Kismayo.By Law there is not any Authority called Jubbaland and there is not any President of that regions only a Chairman as stated in the now infamous Agreement..From this document you can see the true Colors of Mr. Ahemd Madobe and the real Agenda they have for the Jubba regions. Personally I wrote before in my blog how this agreement was a" game" of the Tigre Regime of ETHIOPIA and their associate IGAD countries to subdivide and control at the end the OIL and GAS of the JUBBA regions of Somalia..Wait and see.

Last UN Security Council Resolution on Somalia.Wait and see.

The Security Council today extended the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to 31 October 2014, requesting the African Union to increase the troop strength of that regional peacekeeping body from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel as part of overall efforts to combat the increasingly asymmetrical tactics of Al-Shabaab rebels in the country. Unanimously adopting resolution 2124 (2013) under the Charter’s Chapter VII, the 15-member body also expanded the logistical support package for AMISOM for a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 October 2014. It agreed with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia were not yet appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, taking note of benchmarks for such efforts outlined in his 14 October letter (document S/2013/606). By other terms, the Council underlined that increases in force strength were to provide enhancement of AMISOM’s military capacity for 18 to 24 months, and further, were part of the Mission’s overall exit strategy, after which a decrease in force strength would be considered. It agreed with the Secretary-General on the critical need for sourcing contingent-owned equipment, including force enablers and multipliers, either from existing AMISOM troop contributors or other States, citing the particular need for up to 12 military helicopters. It encouraged Member States to respond in that regard. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General to work with the African Union to improve by 1 January 2014 the strategic management of AMISOM by strengthening command and control structures, the coordination of contingents, joint operations with the Somali National Army (SNA) and information management. As for Somali institutions, the Council requested the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM to provide – as exceptional support — food, water, fuel, transport, tents and “in-theatre” medical evacuation to front-line units of the Somali National Army, the funding for which would be provided from an appropriate United Nations trust fund. Regarding United Nations personnel, the Council took note of the Secretary-General’s intention to deploy a guard force to strengthen security at the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). It requested details on its deployment “as soon as possible” and emphasized, in that context, the importance of AMISOM’s protection of Mogadishu International Airport Compound within the troop ceiling. On the political front, it urged increased collaboration among the African Union, United Nations and Somali Government towards a comprehensive approach to peace, security and development. Speaking after adoption, the representative of the Russian Federation said he had voted in favour of the resolution to support African Union efforts in fostering settlement in Somalia, based on the key role that its mission had played in that regard. However, some of his Government’s concerns had not been borne in mind. He was seriously concerned by the wording in paragraph 21, which outlined the Somali Government’s requirement to provide full access to humanitarian organizations, which ran counter to the principles of humanitarian assistance. He went on to say that the Federal Government was not in a position to control a significant part of the country and that humanitarian organizations were leaving Somalia not because they had been hindered by the Government, but rather, because of the security situation. In establishing humanitarian principles, the Council was getting into an area not covered by its remit — standard setting, which was covered by the General Assembly. Therefore, he did not consider the wording in paragraph 21 as setting a precedent. The representative of Somalia said that, over the last year, the important parts of his country’s six-pillar policy had been implemented. While the Council had “sustained” Somalia for a long time, there was now a light at the end of the tunnel. Its partnership in support of critical priorities was at a turning point. Indeed, the Council had noted the achievements of AMISOM to liberate Somalia from the scourge of Al-Shabaab, as well as the assistance and training that had enabled his Government to liberate the residual components of that group. He went on to express hope that the Somali Army contingent fighting with AMISOM to defeat Al-Shabaab would be supported in a more consistent and timely manner by the United Nations, raising questions over when resources from the United Nations trust fund would arrive. AMISOM had been given 18 to 24 months to complete its mandate and he wondered if the trust fund would allow Somali armed forces to liberate the country in enough time for preparations for elections in 2015-2016 to proceed. All means should be applied to ensure those funds arrived as soon as possible. "Otherwise it will be a disaster for Somalia once again," he cautioned. The meeting began at 10:10 a.m. and ended at 10:25 a.m. Resolution The full text of resolution 2124 (2013) reads as follows: “The Security Council, “Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation in Somalia, in particular resolutions 2036 (2012), 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia, “Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia, “Taking note of the Joint African Union (AU)-United Nations Mission on the benchmarks for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia and their assessment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Security Forces, and underlining the importance it attaches to greater peace, prosperity and stability in Somalia, “Taking note of the AU Peace and Security Council’s 10 October Communiqué on the Joint AU-United Nations Review of AMISOM and the benchmarking exercise, and welcoming in particular its call to all AU Member States to contribute financially to AMISOM, “Welcoming the constructive manner in which both the Secretariat and the AU conducted the joint review, “Underlining its gratitude for the work of AMISOM, in particular the extraordinary sacrifices made by AMISOM forces and personnel in pursuit of peace in Somalia, “Welcoming the support of the international community to peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM, and emphasizing the importance of new contributors sharing the financial burden of supporting AMISOM, “Noting with appreciation recent high-level events on Somalia which have generated substantial pledges of support, and underlining the importance of delivering on any support pledged at these events, “Condemning recent Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, which serve to undermine the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and expressing its solidarity with the people and Governments of Somalia and the region, “Expressing serious concern at the Secretary-General’s assessment in his 14 October letter to the Security Council that recent security gains against Al‑Shabaab are at serious risk of being reversed, and noting that the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM have now assumed a more defensive posture, “Noting the Secretary-General’s assessment that there is an urgent need to resume and strengthen the military campaign against Al Shabaab, which requires an enhancement of international support to the Somali National Security Forces and to AMISOM, “Noting the Secretary-General’s assessment that a comprehensive strategy that includes political, economic and military components is needed to reduce the asymmetrical threat posed by Al-Shabaab, “Acting under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, AMISOM “1. Decides to authorize the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013), until 31 October 2014, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate; “2. Agrees with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia are not yet appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, takes note of the benchmarks for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation as set out in the Secretary-General’s 14 October letter, and endorsed in the 11 October letter of the AU Commission Chairperson, and requests that the Secretary-General keeps progress against the benchmarks under continuous review, in consultation with the AU, and with a view to creating conducive conditions for the potential deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and the hand-over of security responsibilities to national authorities; “3. Requests the AU to increase AMISOM’s force strength from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel as set out in the Secretary-General’s 14 October letter; “4. Decides to expand the logistical support package for AMISOM, referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 2093 (2013), for a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 October 2014, ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of the United Nations funds as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1910 (2010), and consistent with the requirements of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy; “5. Underlines that, in line with the Joint United Nations-AU Review of AMISOM, the increases in the force strength decided in this resolution are to provide a short-term enhancement of AMISOM’s military capacity, for a period of 18 to 24 months and as part of an overall exit strategy for AMISOM, after which a decrease in AMISOM’s force strength will be considered; “6. Agrees with the Secretary-General on the critical need for sourcing contingent owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012) either from existing AMISOM Troop-Contributing Countries or other Member States, emphasizes in particular the need for an appropriate aviation component of up to twelve military helicopters, and encourages Member States to respond to AU efforts to mobilize such equipment; “7. Reiterates paragraphs 5 of resolution 2093 (2013) regarding logistical support to AMISOM; “8. Further reiterates paragraph 13 of resolution 2093 (2013) on the strengthening of women and children’s protection in AMISOM operations and activities; “9. Requests the Secretary-General to work closely with the AU in order to support the implementation of this resolution, in particular by improving efficiency in the planning and strategic management of AMISOM, including strengthening command and control structures, the operational coordination of contingents, joint operations with the SNA, and information management, through a new Concept of Operations by 1 January 2014, with a view to enabling AMISOM to respond to the increasingly asymmetrical tactics used by Al-Shabaab, through an effective resumption of the military campaign against Al-Shabaab, which would rapidly reduce its capacity to control key strategic locations, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the AU in the planning, deployment and management of AMISOM through the United Nations office to the AU, and reiterates its request to the Secretary-General, in view of the substantial increases in AMISOM capabilities and support to the SNA, to enhance the provision of technical advice to the AU through existing United Nations mechanisms; “10. Requests the AU to advance efforts to implement a system to address allegations of misconduct, which includes clear mechanisms for receiving and tracking allegations, as well as for following up with troop-contributing countries on the results of the investigations and disciplinary actions taken as applicable, and requests the United Nations to redouble its efforts to advise and provide guidance to the AU in this endeavour; “11. Reiterates its request, and that of the AU Peace and Security Council, for AMISOM to develop further an effective approach to the protection of civilians, and stresses in particular the urgent need for AMISOM to establish and use a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell, as requested in resolution 2093 (2013); “12. Underlines the importance of AMISOM abiding by all requirements applicable to it under international human rights and humanitarian law, further underlines in particular the need for AMISOM to ensure that any detainees in their custody, including disengaged combatants, are treated in strict compliance with applicable obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, including ensuring their humane treatment and further requests AMISOM to allow appropriate access to detainees by a neutral body, and to establish Standard Operating Procedures for the handover of any detainees, including children, who come into their custody during a military operation; “13. Reiterates its call for new donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment, technical assistance and uncaveated funding for AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, and underlines the AU’s call for their Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM; Somali federal security institutions “14. Takes note of the Secretary-General’s recommendation of the need to provide targeted support to front line units of the Somali National Army (SNA), requests UNSOA to support the SNA through the provision of food and water, fuel, transport, tents and in theatre medical evacuation, decides that this exceptional support shall be provided only for joint SNA operations with AMISOM and which are part of AMISOM’s overall Strategic Concept, further decides that funding for this support will be provided from an appropriate United Nations trust fund, and encourages Member States to make uncaveated contributions to the trust fund; “15. Underlines that the support outlined in paragraph 14 of this resolution must be in full compliance with the United Nations Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), further underlines its expectation that the Secretary-General will report on all UNSOA support to the SNA including on the implementation of the HRDDP, and also requests AMISOM to use its Civilian Casualties Tracking Analysis and Response cell as part of its reporting on joint AMISOM operations with the SNA; “16. Underlines that all forces supported by UNSOA shall act in compliance with the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and in that context further underlines its expectation that the Federal Government of Somalia will give its assurance to the Security Council, including in writing, that any Government forces being supported by UNSOA on joint operations with AMISOM will act in compliance with the HRDDP, and recalls the importance of training in this regard; “17. Requests that to assist UNSOM to fulfil its mission, the Head of UNSOA shall keep the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed on the implementation of the AMISOM support package, and further requests the Secretary-General to include this information in his regular reporting to the Security Council; “18. Calls upon the Federal Government of Somalia to continue its efforts, with the support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), AMISOM (in accordance with their respective mandates), and other international partners to strengthen the Somali National Security Forces including by mapping the structure of these forces, establishing clear command and control systems, implementing appropriate procedures, codes of conduct and training including to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment and finalizing and implementing a national program for the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants and promoting respect for human rights, including through implementing the relevant Somali Government action plans on children and armed conflict; “19. Further requests UNSOM, in accordance with its mandate, to continue to assist in the rebuilding of Somali security institutions, and reiterates in particular UNSOM’s role in providing strategic policy advice on security sector reform (SSR) and assisting the Federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international donor support on SSR; “20. Requests UNSOM, working closely with the AU, to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in developing broad principles on the nature of policing in Somalia with a view to proposing further options to support the development of an effective police force in Somalia; “21. Requests the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure the protection and well-being of all internally displaced persons, including from sexual violence and exploitation, paying particular attention to ensuring that the human rights of internally displaced persons in Somalia are respected in relation to relocations, and to ensure a fully consultative process, providing prior notice and ensuring safe, sanitary new sites that have basic services, as well as full, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations; Security of United Nations personnel “22. Takes note of the Secretary-General’s intention to deploy an appropriate United Nations Static Guard unit to strengthen security at UNSOM compounds, looks forward to receiving further details of its deployment as outlined in the Secretary-General’s 14 October letter as soon as possible, and strongly emphasizes the importance of AMISOM’s protection of Mogadishu International Airport Compound within the troop ceiling authorized in this resolution; Political process “23. Urges increased collaboration between the AU, United Nations and Federal Government of Somalia, including on a comprehensive approach to peace, security and development which integrates political, security, peacebuilding and development activities, recognizing that none can succeed in isolation; “24. Recalls its 13 September 2013 statement welcoming the agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Interim Jubba Administration, emphasizes the importance of all parties ensuring that the timelines as stipulated in the agreement are met, and further emphasizes the importance of the Federal Government of Somalia ensuring the right political conditions are in place to ensure greater peace and stability in Somalia; “25. Welcomes in this context the efforts undertaken by the Federal Government of Somalia to consolidate security and establish the rule of law in areas secured by AMISOM and the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and encourages it to continue to lead an inclusive national dialogue, with the support of UNSOM, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the AU to clarify and settle relations between the Federal government of Somalia and existing and emerging local administrations and initiate processes of national reconciliation in order to accelerate efforts to establish sustainable, legitimate and representative local governance structures across the country, especially in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab; “26. Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to finalize and adopt a federal Constitution by December 2015, to prepare for and hold credible elections in 2016; and to ensure the equitable participation of women, youth, minority groups and other marginalized groups in national political processes; “27. Further encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to implement its “Vision 2016” agenda which sets out the importance of a Somali-owned, inclusive, and transparent political process and economic recovery, consistent with the Provisional Constitution and including an effective federal political system and a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration; Sanctions “28. Expresses concern at continuing violations of the Security Council charcoal ban requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to raise awareness amongst relevant Member States on their requirements to abide by the charcoal ban, as set out in resolution 2036 (2012); “29. Underlines the importance of the Federal Government of Somalia and Member States complying with all aspects of the arms embargo, including the reporting and notification requirements set out in resolution 2111 (2013); Reporting “30. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of all aspects of this resolution as part of his regular reporting to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia; 31. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”  Somali news leader  www.jowhar.com  jowharcom@hotmail.com  golfyare@gmail.com Hanad on November 14 2013

#Somalia: Why Yussur Abraar resigned from Governor of Centra...

#Somalia: Why Yussur Abraar resigned from Governor of Centra...:   The case of Madam YusurAbraar the Central Bank Governor resigning after seven weeks on the Job is one of the worst Scandals happened to ...

Why Yussur Abraar resigned from Governor of Central Bank and the endemic/systematic corruption of Somalia (Part 1). Wait and see.

  The case of Madam YusurAbraar the Central Bank Governor resigning after seven weeks on the Job is one of the worst Scandals happened to the government of President Hassan Sheik. In the more developed democracies were the concept of transparency and accountability is the cornerstone of the “workings” of governance this would have prompted the resignation of the Minister of Finance or even higher up in government. We all know that Somalia is one of the most corrupt Nations on Earth and that corruption is what we “ call the Norm rather than the Exception”. But even knowing all this does not make us forgiving or understand how on earth Ministers and directors of the Presidency  linked to Damu Jadid  pro-Salafist group  can think they can steal “Public money” with “Impunity” with a total disregard to the Public good and the National Public interest. I had a hope and still have that President Hassan Sheik will reign on the Big grand scale acts of Corruption and will accept the small amounts being almost impossible to control this culture of corruption and mismanagement.

       I believe that the acts of corruption on large or small are acts are “existential treats “against the promotion and the National Institution Building of our failed State and reestablishment of Our nation-State”. This type of corruption I always asserted is part of the game plans of the Ethiopians and their  ally the IGAD countries to say Somalis cannot be a viable state and must be re-colonized by the regional powers and made Clan-Enclaves controlled by those powers. How on Earth sums in the millions of Dollars can be  attempted to be swindled  by this Ruling Elites with Total disregard of the sufferings of the people-citizens?  Some will say that the former Presidents and governments have all been corrupt/mismanaged  and stealing of public money on large scale is a “normal business”  therefore there is not any difference between this new government of President Hassan Sheik and the past governments starting from 2004.

       We Somalis in General  and those in  the Diaspora, the international community and even of those “not corrupt elites” in Mogadishu we were hoping the “business as usual “of stealing public money will diminish to a manageable level  and the Government will treat corruption and mismanagement  as equal to “Terrorism” and being against the National Public interests. In other words equal to the fight against #AlShabaab and being labeled as Traitor to the Nation. No way. Still Ministers especially those in the Presidency are behaving like nothing has changed and the Culture of Impunity is the only thing they Know not the Law or any other punishment against their persona for the criminal acts they commit while they are in office.

       There is the story going around in the Internet that those who tried to convince Yussur Abraar to take part in a big scam to defraud the Somali government of Millions of Dollars  and intimidated her after she refused their plans were “ close members of the President family” and a business man from South Africa of the same sub-clan. For me it’s not important who are his persons but the act itself of trying/ attempting  with a high ranking officer of the Government is itself a crime and this happens everybody knows that there will never be punished and brought to justice for the crimes of attempting to stealing Public money. Till this persons are brought in front of a judge and sentenced “beyond reasonable doubt” they are innocent” but in Somalia nobody is prosecuted for attempting/stealing Public money. I can only remember the case of two district commissioners of Mogadishu who after they have stolen food Aid worth Thousands of Dollars where pardoned by the former President even after they were sentenced and found guilty by a Court of Law.

       This will continue to happen all over Somalia including the Regions of Somaliland and Puntland for this following reasons: 1)the absence of the Rule of Law in the administration of the “State public affairs”. 2) The Total absence of norms of Transparency and Accountability in the running of the Public administration.3) The believe that the  President, Ministers will never be punished and brought to justice because they know and everybody knows that they are the Kings of the Land( Regions)  and they will never be brought to account for their crimes. In other words the Culture of Impunity is supreme in all aspects of Governance.4) The international community I mean the West and UN have always been part of this High scale corruption/mismanagement in the last 23 years and in some instances’ it looks they even encouraged it when it came to the workings of NGOs (local and international including those who say are “religious based” including the Muslim ones) who stole millions of Dollars with their Somali managers and collusion of International Staff. In Somalia in the popular parlance they call “NGOs Culture” and “behavior” the acts to steal pubic money. And the individuals who were managers, worked for NGOs are at the forefront of this government as Ministers.5) The State in all its forms be Regional or Federal is seen as a “Milking cow to make money “in the popular culture and not a service to the Nation or a Public property. If this Kind of Culture is not changed and nothing is done to Change the cultural/political  perception and the Legal workings of the State, the same existence of the Somali Nationhood/State will be in Danger in the future. The Salafist Business cartels that control the totality of the Somali economy have as a policy that the existence/practice of a week government which is corrupt and mismanaged is in their Best interest. In that way the state is controlled by this Salafist groups and will never fulfill its Role of defender/promoter  of the interests of the People-citizens and Somali National Interests but the promoter of the Salafist Agenda within the State.(please read “Who are Business people of Somalia?” in my blog wardigley.blogspot.com).

        There are other groups who are allied with the Salafist Business cartels mainly the “Organized crimes” groups  which are mostly are Salafist but their business are mainly about “expired Food stuff”, “expired medicines”, “Expired general products” etc, Human Trafficking and all this is done all over the greater Horn of Africa/East /Central Africa. The Other group is the “Drug-Cartels” who import to Somalia “Heroin” from Afghanistan and Indian Sub-Continent including Pakistan. This Drugs are then Exported to East Africa/Central Africa and re-exported to US and Europe, Middle East.

       Who are the groups who benefit from this Corruption? First what is the Role of The Salafist Business cartels in the Corruption/mismanagement of the Somalia State (It’s included in my analysis the regional authorities of Somaliland and Puntalnd. Everything I say concerning the corruption and Organized crimes/Drug Cartels groups is similar in all over Somalia). What are the Role of Organized crimes groups and the Drug cartels in this corruption based “governance” of the Somali State? What is the Role of these groups in the Government machinery? What is the role of The Ethiopian Intelligence and the Somali-Elites-Organized crimes/Drug-cartels groups Trojan horses in the Government,and those who represent the Ethiopian interest? How they have become corrupted (or they were before they came to Somalia) the Armies of the Countries in Amisom? What is the Role of Amisom in the corruption/Mismanagement of the “Cosa Publica” of Somalia? I will try to answer these very sensitive questions which are also at the core of the issues of corruption and mismanagement in Somalia.After I will  dwell on how to   Stem/stop the Illegal drugs flow to somalia and the Organiozed crimes groups hold on part of Somali economy.( It will be in Part.2 ( to be continued).

#Somalia: How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya.By Dai...

#Somalia: How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya.By Dai...: How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya A survivor of the 1998 terror attack in Nairobi is removed from ground zero. Photo/FILE  ...

How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya.By Daily Nation 28 October 2013.

How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya

A survivor of the 1998 terror attack in Nairobi is removed from ground zero. Photo/FILE 

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Monday, October 28, 2013

For five years, the terrorists stayed with us, masquerading as businessmen, tourists, and charity workers. Behind the scenes, they plotted murder.

On the morning of August 7, 1998, two vehicles drove out of house number 43 in Nairobi’s New Runda Estate.

The lead pick-up was driven by Fazul Mohammed, also known as Harun, while the second, a Toyota Dyna, which was carrying a bomb, was driven by Jihad Mohammed Ali (aka Azzam), with Mohammed Rashid Daoud Al-Owhali in the passenger’s seat.

The day had come…

The Al-Qaeda group, then headed by Osama bin Laden, had established its operations in Kenya in 1993 when they registered a business in Nairobi under Asma Limited.

It was registered by Khalid Fawwaz, who later transferred it to Al-Qaeda military commander, Abu al Banshiri. They also registered another business known as Tanzanite King.

Using this cover, the group started laying strategy on how to retaliate against the US its participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

Asma Limited was supposed to carry out export-import business but the Al-Qaeda members were cash-strapped after hiring the Nairobi office, forcing them to sell the furniture and other fittings.

It was the entry of Mohammed Sadeek Odeh in 1994 that was to change the fate of the terror group in Kenya.

Odeh arrived in Mombasa and received the group’s military commanders and trainers, Muhamed Atef and Banshiri. They presented a six-foot, seven-tonne fibre-glass fishing boat to Odeh. It was to become the lifeline of the Kenyan cell.

Another arrival through Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport was an American jihadist known as Wadih El Haji, masquerading as a precious stones dealer.

'HELP AFRICA PEOPLE'

He opened a new business in Nairobi, Tanzanite King. El Haji, a Lebanese-American who travelled on a US passport, was to become Osama bin Laden’s main contact in East Africa.

Known as “The Manager” within the Kenyan cell, El Haji was a graduate of the University of Louisiana.

His entry was to facilitate the registration of another camouflage, a non-governmental organisation, Help Africa People, which was to be used as the official Al-Qaeda cover in Kenya.

His deputy was Fazul, a Comorian who would lead the bombing truck on the morning of August 7.

Help Africa People had been registered in Germany and it gave Fazul the best cover in Kenya. Unknown to many, Fazul had in 1993 been involved in the downing of two US Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu, forcing the US to pull its troops out of Somalia.

Fazul returned to the Comoros briefly and married a girl he had never met before, 17-year-old Halima, a madrasa student.

Three weeks later he entered Kenya as Harun Fazul together with his new wife and hired an apartment in Nairobi.

With the boat, Asma Limited, and the NGO in place, the group started arming itself with bomb-building components. They established code names for them — TNT and detonator cords were known as “tools”, hand grenades were “potatoes”, while fake travel documents were known as “goods”.

In 1994, Al-Qaeda sent another operative, Mustafa Ahmed, to open yet another company, the Nairobi branch of bin Laden’s Taba Investment Company, which was then operating in Tanzania.

Odeh and Mustafa established themselves as fish suppliers and conducted booming business with leading restaurants and hotels. Odeh was referred to as “Mohammed, the fisherman,” and he loved it.

Meanwhile, Fazul moved his wife to Khartoum, which allowed him to move between Nairobi, Khartoum ,and Mogadishu with ease using the miraa aircraft transportation network.

He was the least of suspects. He was working for an NGO and, unknown to the security forces, the cell had links to another NGO, Mercy International Relief Agency, run by Safar al Hawali, and the Nairobi branch of Haramayn Foundation.

With all these contacts, Fazul managed to ferry cash to members of the cells with ease. On the ground, his NGO’s mission was to deliver emergency humanitarian aid — food, medicine, clothing, and shelter — to people in need.

Odeh, a Palestinian from Jordan, was firmly settled in Mombasa in the fishing business, Fazul was in Nairobi as an NGO manager, while El Haji was a gemstone dealer with an office in Nairobi and also working with Mercy International.

NECESSARY BACK-UP

Two Al-Qaeda commanders based in the region, Muhammed Atef and Abu al Banshiri, gave the group the necessary back-up.

In 1996, El Haji, the gemstone dealer and the fishing boat manager, Odeh, transported $7,000 received from bin Laden to Mombasa to kick-start the militarisation of the East African cells.

In Mombasa, Odeh, using the fishing boat as a cover, received the “tools” — TNT and detonators — obtained in Tanzania from the Mombasa-born Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, a senior figure in the cell.

The fishing boat business allowed Odeh to frequent the coast of Tanzania from Somalia, selling other people’s catches.

Odeh was well trained. Born in Saudi Arabia, he had studied engineering at the Far Eastern University in the Philipines, where he was active in Islamic activities and listened to video lectures of Abdullah Azzam, the man who coined the term Al-Qaeda (meaning “The Base”) and the spiritual mentor of bin Laden.

Odeh quit university in his final year, went to Afghanistan to join Mujahideen, and underwent military training before he was sent to Somalia by bin Laden to help clan leader, Mohammed Farah Aideed, who was waging war against the US marines.

But this acquisition of bomb-making material was slowed down in May 1996 when Abu al Banshiri died while aboard MV Bukoba, the Tanzanian ferry that sunk 56 kilometres off Mwanza, killing more than 1,000 people.

With the death of Banshiri, Fazul became the principal contact for the Kenyan mission and moved to Nairobi, where he lived with El Haji’s family and served as his assistant at the NGO.

Meanwhile in Afghanistan, another man, Rashid Daoud Al-Owhali, had just completed training in explosives, hijacking and kidnaping, assassination, and intelligence techniques.

He was to be sent to Nairobi for the final mission.

With everything set, Osama bin Laden proclaimed a jihad on August 23, 1996, asking Muslims to take up arms against US establishments anywhere in the world.

Fazul got scared and sent an alert, saying the East African cell was “100 per cent endangered”, and complaining that he had heard the news from CNN.

That December 21, 1996, El Haji, the fake gemstone dealer, sent a coded letter to Baku, Azerbaijan, confirming that he had shipped three false passports to persons in Azerbaijan. One was for Al-Owhali to enable him to travel to Kenya to drive the vehicle carrying the bomb.

He then left Nairobi for Pakistan to meet the Al-Qaeda team. That February, 1997, El Haji met with bin Laden and briefed him on the East African cells.

TRIP TO SOMALIA

In March 1997, bin Laden ordered Odeh, the Mombasa-based “fish trader”, to travel to Somalia and assess “the Islamic struggle” in the country and report back.

Odeh stayed there for seven months and returned to Kenya, settling in the tiny village of Witu near the Somalia border, where he set up a small furniture business with his brother-in-law while waiting for the final orders.

Meanwhile, in September 1997, an Al-Qaeda defector, Jamal Ahmed, walked into the Nairobi US embassy to report that seven men working for a local NGO had connections with bin Laden.

The CIA thought the intelligence was of little value and only asked the Kenyan Government to deport the group.

A night raid was carried out but the assembled documents did not give leads to any impending attack. Nothing was done.

That November, another man, an Egyptian named Mustafa Ahmed, sought an appointment with the US embassy in Nairobi and informed the officials there that a group of terrorists based in Kenya were planning to car-bomb the embassy.

After questioning the man, the CIA concluded that he was lying but asked ambassador Prudence Bushnell to seek additional security.

She wrote to Washington but her request was disregarded.

During this period, the CIA raided El Haji’s home, seeking to seize digital and paper data.

But Fazul, who was staying with El Haji, had managed to cart away most of the files and those seized were on the NGO’s activities — distribution of mosquito nets, water tanks, and drugs.

Fazul left for Sudan, hoping to watch the developing situation. There was another raid at the Haramayn Foundation with zero success and luckily for the terrorists, nobody followed up and the investigations were dropped, allowing Fazul to return.

His top priority was to buy a vehicle to deliver the bombs and rent safe houses to build them. Time was running out. With the help of a Mr Sikander Juma, he rented Runda House number 43, a secure villa with a high wall, in May, 1998, just three months to the D-Day.

The property owner, Tamarra Ratemo, was told that Fazul wanted to settle his family and guests. Unknown to the landlord, this was to be the bomb factory and Fazul’s family lived with Sikander Juma and at times in El Haji’s house elsewhere in Nairobi.

Eleven months before the bombings, El Haji had quietly moved from Nairobi to Arlington, Texas, leaving the operations in the hands of Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah alias Saleh, also known as Abu Mariam.

The Runda house was perfect. It had four bedrooms, three baths, and a garage suited for bomb-building.

Fazul, aka Harun, moved in with his wife and two children and purchased a beige-coloured Toyota Dyna truck and, using another smaller pick-up, he started moving the bomb-building materials to Runda, some concealed in boxes of lobsters.

At the Runda garage, Fazul supervised the construction of two massive, one-tonne devises made of about 500 cylinders of TNT, fertiliser, and aluminium powder.

Abdel Rahman was taken to Runda to do the electrical work after KK Mohammed had completed the assembly work.

Meanwhile, on August 1, 1998, Abu Mariam, the key Al-Qaeda commander in East Africa, issued an order to all Al-Qaeda personnel in Kenya to leave the country by August 6.

The attacks were scheduled for the next day. The US embassy at the junction of Moi and Haile Selassie avenues was vulnerable. The targeted basement parking was manned by an unarmed guard and a manually operated drop bar.

The Saturday before the attack, Odeh, the fisherman, met with Ally Msalam, who ordered him to “get out of here!”

In the final days, Odeh had become unreliable and broke. He did not even have money for an air ticket and his passport had expired.

A Yemeni passport was stolen for him and he was asked to go and see someone at the immigration office in Mombasa with his photo.

On August 2, the proposed bomber arrived at Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and took a taxi to Ramada Hotel in Eastleigh, where he booked Room 24.

He called someone in Pakistan to confirm his arrival. That day, Fazul drove to Ramada and picked up his guest. He paid the bills even though the guest had not stayed overnight. They both left for Runda.

Meanwhile, Odeh was under pressure to leave the country. Ally Msalam on Monday, August 3, secured Odeh’s travel papers from immigration, secured an airline ticket, and asked him to meet the group at Nairobi’s Hilltop Hotel for final directions.

Another arrival in Nairobi that week from Afghanistan was Jihad Mohammed Ali “Azzam”, who was also now at the Runda villa.

Here, Abu Mariam gave the final instructions to Fazul, Azzam, and Al-Owhali. Azzam would drive the bomb vehicle following Fazul, who would show him the way to the American embassy while Al-Owhali would be the passenger.

Armed with a pistol, Al-Owhali was supposed to scare the guard to raise the drop bar to allow Azzam to drive as close to the building as possible — or to the underground parking. He was to also scare Kenyans from the scene by throwing grenades.

At the Hilltop Hotel, the final base for the terrorists, Odeh checked into Room 102b using the fake Yemeni passport. He held a final meeting with four other members — Ally Msalam, Fazul, and Huseein.

FINAL BASE FOR TERRORISTS

They were all to meet in Afghanistan in a week’s time. Odeh, who looked scared of travelling, was forced to shave his beard and given some cologne and cigarettes to make him look like a westernised traveller.

On August 4, Ally Msalam, Fazul, and the bombers went round the embassy building for final surveillance, and did so for the next two days.

They were later dropped at Runda and that night Ally Msalam flew out of Kenya. Odeh was the last to leave and generally unprepared. At 10pm on the night of August 6, he boarded a Pakistani International Airlines flight.

The next morning, Al-Owhali, dressed in black shoes, blue jeans, white short-sleeved shirt, and a blue cotton jacket, put four stun grenades on his belt and a 9mm Bereta pistol in his jacket pocket.

With Azzam, they boarded the Toyota Dyna — the bomb vehicle. Fazul noticed that Al-Owhali’s jacket was concealing the pistol and ordered him to remove it to enable him to reach the grenades faster.

As Azzam approached the drop bar, Al-Owhali alighted to go and scare the guard, but halfway, he realised that his pistol was in the jacket, which he had left in the truck.

He threw a grenade at the guard, who took off, leaving the drop bar down. Azzam drove parallel to the embassy as Al-Owhali pondered what to do. He pressed the button. A deafening blast rocked Nairobi.

Al-Owhali was not dead. He walked to a nearby clinic that was treating victims, but realised that he still had a stun grenade in his belt. Unnoticed, he put it in a trash bin.

He was then taken by an ambulance to MP Shah Hospital, where he registered as Khalid Salim and had his forehead cut stitched.

He was discharged but as he reached into his pocket, he realised that he still had three bullets and key to the padlock that had locked the back door of the bomb truck.

He returned to the hotel and tried to flush them down the toilet. He hid them inside a window ledge when that failed. He thought he could walk to Runda but he did not know the direction.

Since he was supposed to die in the bomb truck, he had not carried his passport (it was still in Runda) and money.

At the hotel, the booking clerk brought a Yemeni to help him. He got new clothes and threw the bloodied ones in the dustbin.

Meanwhile in Karachi, the news of the Nairobi bombing was on all channels.

Odeh managed to slip through immigration but an observant officer realised that the man in the passport had a beard, unlike Odeh who had been ordered to shave it off in Nairobi. Odeh tried to bribe the officer and he was asked: “Are you a terrorist running away from Nairobi?” He was arrested. Al-Owhali was also arrested in Nairobi and they started to spill the beans.

#Somalia: Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility.B...

#Somalia: Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility.B...: Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility by Mohamud M Uluso Friday, October 27, 2013 The opinion piece of renowned Som...

Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility.By Mohamed M.Ulusso.

Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility

by Mohamud M Uluso
Friday, October 27, 2013

The opinion piece of renowned Somali born novelist, professor Nuruddin Farah, published on the opinion pages of October 14 New York Times, under the title Somalia's Leader: Look Past the Hype, recycles the bashing lines that few Somali politicians fallen from grace with the people of Somalia have been throwing at president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for quite some time for self-serving aims. The piece trumps up political allegations while it dismisses the truths and contexts. Surprisingly, the professor, contrary to what expected from an enlightened person like him, has lowered himself by owing and circulating hearsay stories he doubts their truthfulness.  

Sadly, by stating that “President Mohamud didn’t have the determination to lead the country, nor the hardiness to stand up to clan elders who have contributed to the two decade civil war and still dominate the country,”, which seems overboard assertion, the professor nurtures the bad culture he warned against, which is “Somalis are notorious for their petty mindedness, tendency to focus on their grievances and constant warring.” The sum of the implicitly singled out clan elders and their followers, the great number of political panhandlers and their peers, the terrorist and piracy groups and their associates, and the pervasive culture of petty mindedness will leave Somalia with no good people.

While the government has the responsibility to explain the case of the killer of the staff members of Doctors Without Borders released by appellate judges, all other allegations crammed in the piece are personal attacks to defeat good policies beneficial for all Somalis. The allegations include the claim of loss  of credibility among the Troop Contributing Countries of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)-probably intended for Kenya, the disputed Central Bank fleecing, professor Ahmed Ismail Samater’s frivolous complain of losing the presidential election for vote buying, and Dr. Ali Khalif Galleyr’s preposterous allegation that unnamed British and American intelligence sources linked president Hassan to Al Shabab- a terrorist group bent to destroy any Somali government- and finally the demand for the prosecution of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys for terrorism in difference to his allies now hailed as heroes. In conclusion, Professor Nuruddin appeals to the West to end its darling of President Hassan, and particularly to the Time Magazine to re-evaluate its claim that president Hassan as one of the 100 most influential people in the world.

First, as background, in 2006, upon the request of undisclosed but maybe now identifiable member of the defunct Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Professor Nuruddin had extensive discussions with Sheikh Hassan Aweys and other leaders during his failed mediation mission between the ICU and the former Transitional Federal Government of President Abdullahi Yusuf. In the opinion piece titled My Life as Diplomat published in the New York Times on May 26, 2007, the professor didn’t hide his distaste towards Sheikh Hassan Aweys.  

Second, according to Professor Ahmed I. Samater’s admission, the abysmal failure of his presidential ambition was not principally due to money but to many other factors including strong doubt about his leadership as a Somali politician and the genuineness of his slogans, later confirmed by his sudden political conversion. Third, the pitiful leadership performances of former Prime Ministers were sufficient to take their allegations with grain of salt.

Among the 2012 presidential candidates, President Hassan was one of the most qualified presidential candidates in terms of character, education, good understanding of domestic problems and international geopolitics. He pledged to focus on establishing  the foundations of the Somali State, neglected by the preceding transitional governments. That doesn’t mean that president Hassan’s leadership is without major political mistakes but the allegations in the piece are idle talk (fadhi ku dirir) stories.

The major source of the on-going political tension in Somalia is due to the clash between the clan rivalries fueled by yet to be defined federal system and the urgent need for a national integration under the rule of law for ending state fragility. The performance of the Somali government depends on many factors, including nationalistic leadership, the overcoming of the civil war bitterness and Somali elite egocentricity, and check on foreign interventions.

After more than two decades of statelessness for civil war and foreign manipulations, the first permanent national representative government, which controls only a fraction of the country, has exceptionally received diplomatic recognition from key international powers. Unfortunately, some have seen this international special treatment as a personal gift to President Hassan rather than seeing it  as an opportunity for the Somali people to collectively own their country and destiny by fostering internal unity despite many differences.

The leaders of the new government pledged to restore and protect the sovereignty, dignity, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Somalia on the basis of not on clan fiefdoms and preferences, but on national strategy founded on decentralized regional administrations connected and loyal to a democratic accountable central authority and not to foreign powers. The stay in state fragility, defined as a country where the government lacks the ability to perform the functions necessary for the security and well-being of the population languishing in poverty, insecurity and hopelessness, is immoral and unacceptable.

Neighboring countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) have diplomatic relations with Somalia but they deliberately ignore the  respect of the principles of equality of states and  no-interference, and are determined to vandalize the gained international diplomatic recognition. As reported by Ethiopian Government’s News bulletin of October 23, Ethiopia establishes a strategic relationship with Somaliland and is proud of the role it played in the endorsement of the Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA) in Brussels with the support of UK and Danish governments. In addition, Ethiopia leads the process of alienating the people in the Jubba regions. These blatant interferences are one of the major challenges facing the Somali government because it fuels internal political instability and loss of legitimacy. The expert witnesses at US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' hearing on the Security and Governance in Somalia, held on October 8, unanimously stressed that the US government should rein in the aggressive intervention of Kenya and Ethiopia in the internal affairs of Somalia to ensure peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.

During the last eight years, the international community spent billions of dollars in the name of Somalia, but the new Government did not inherit: (a) a constitution which ends the country’s fragmentation into clan enclaves; (b) basic public administration structure; (c) an established security forces; (d) credible public record; and (e) national revenue sources except Mogadishu port revenues. Most of the country remained beyond the control of the central government’s legal authority. Nevertheless, some unscrupulous political opponents demand the fulfillment of functions and services beyond the federal government’s capacity for lack of national integration and resources as well as for lack of direct support from the international community. The politically motivated accusations targeted against the president tap the myriads of problems and challenges either left unresolved at their right forums or purposely created by foreign powers to undermine Somalia’s march towards statehood like Jubbaland crisis.

Since the constitution making process of eight years did not resolve the fragmented political power of the country, the role of the federal government remains to support and legitimize the peacemaking efforts of AMISOM forces under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and embrace foreign dictated agenda. However, on September 16, the international community endorsed, in the context of the international engagement with fragile states, a New Deal for Somalia with the pledge of 2.5 billion dollars for 2014-2016. The New Deal is not without dangerous traps.

In general, the goal seems to be to re-establish within three years throughout Somalia the foundations of a Somali State based on the rule of law rather than on clan parochialism. The essential condition for achieving this goal is the unequivocal respect of the federal government’s leadership and immediate fulfillments of theNew Deal pledges. Moreover, the Somali people- government, politicians, religious and community leaders, and elite class- have to set aside the insistence on fractured governance structures and to seize the new opportunity for an integrated system of governance for real peaceful transformation and exit from the fragile situation. The alternative would be a continued polarization and brinkmanship that will hasten the already in progress demise of Somalia, which in turn, will increase regional insecurity.

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Mohamud M. Ulusomohamuduluso@gmail.com-I copied from Hiiraan.com On line to make it Public.

#Somalia: The Criminal motives Behind the Car-Bombing of Ahm...

#Somalia: The Criminal motives Behind the Car-Bombing of Ahm...: If you follow  with keen interest the Murky Somali Politics-an interconnections of Jihadist groups  , Business cartels/Organized crimes/Dru...

The Criminal motives Behind the Car-Bombing of Ahmed Madobe in Kismayo,Somalia.

If you follow  with keen interest the Murky Somali Politics-an interconnections of Jihadist groups  , Business cartels/Organized crimes/Drug-cartels  and Ethiopian intelligence manipulation,plots- you will be puzzled even at the latest assassination attempt on the convoy of Mr. Ahmed Madobe by a suicide car- bomb in the middle of Kismayo town last Thursday Sept 12 /2013  . On 27 August 2013 , before the attempt, there has been  a political deal in Addis-Ababa in which ,strangely the Ethiopian government is guarantor, and  Mr. Ahmed Madobe was recognized by the Somali federal government  as Leader and chairman ( of the executive,legislative and judiciary,Security) of the Jubba administration made of lower Jubba,middle Jubba and Gedo regions. The Somali government got in exchange to be the "sole representative of Somali sovereignty and Nation-State".It was a biased deal which has not taken into account the will of the people of the regions and was not  even made in good faith by the Ethiopians which were directing the whole saga.Also  they were diplomatically told that the Somali government will never accept Subdivision and they have to change their Plans by the international community.Why you would ask? The main reason being that the Ethiopians-Tigre Elites and some of the  Somali-Kenyan establishment,Kenyan Business tycoons  were allied with some groups who were representing Big Oil companies  like Statoil of Norway represented by a former PM and Total oil which was represented by a former Minister of defence,Clan Communities  in this political kaleidoscope of this regions  and  were advocating for an Independent and Sovereign Somali regional state in Jubba regions in a Confederate Somali State.This  new  deal makes Jubba regions Part and Parcel of Somalia but gives exorbitant powers to Mr. Madobe as Leader.This was not good for this groups and they had their own game plans which were are now being  executed by the Ethiopian Intelligence using Al-Shabaab in this car-bombing. First they have putted  in the deal this exorbitant powers of the Leader must not be changed in following negotiations and it must be intact. Secondly they wont " a political and security crisis" in which Mr. Ahmed Madobe will accept their own game- plan and will not accept any negotiation to bring in more clans -communities in the administration  and security services. That is the reason the car- bomb by Al-shabaab was organized by the Ethiopian Intelligence community. My theory has always been that the Ethiopians had contacts within the Al-Shabaab of Ahmed Godane and the Salafist Business cartels which are linked with Al-Shabaab.  Ahnmed Madobe was transported from the airport in a armoured vehicle made of steel  by Amisom while his staff and others travelled in his own car-convoy.The man-Ahmed Madob- will be made to believe in this  pre-planned operation  and accept all the suggestions,game plans  of the Ethiopian intelligence and the Hawks in the Somali clans community,representatives of Oil companies who are against any agreement unless its the recognition of a new sovereign state in South of Somalia.The other motivation  at work its the Ethiopians  would like as stated in the Kampala communique only the Amisom African armies to be stationed in Kismayo without the Re-hatting to UN blue helmets. Therefore with this bombing any UN intervention/deployment  would be scared. More to that at Art. 33 of the Kampala Communique its approved that Amisom and" the Chiefs of Staff of Ethiopia" within the framework of "Amisom Military operations.........to work out the modalities and development of an Amisom Multinational force to deployed to Kismayo". We can see  Ethiopians are back in the security issues and my opinion is they are  against any Multinational force be it African or UN multinational force.Their game plan is to be involved directly in the security issues of the Jubba regions now with  a UN mandate to make legitimate their own security game-plans.With this car-bombing they are telling the world that the place is so dangerous that  they are the Only state who can afford and capable to fight against this dangerous extremism group of Al-Shabaab. All  lies made to confuse and scare the Intentional community and even the Somali government which they hold hostage thanks to IGAD Organization and Amisom Armies. From the timing of the Operation the  car-bomb,the detailed execution,the knowledge of the arrival of Ahmed Madobe,the exact car  to bomb all makes this operation being -pre-planned by the Ethiopians but executed by Al-Shabaab.If you ask me how its possible this Unholy alliance ? First I will direct you to read some of my blogs like " History of the alliance between the Somali Al-Ittixad movement and the Ethiopians" going back to the 80". and other more recent in which I spoke in detail about the strategic  importance for Ethiopia and its backers -China,France, Iran,Italy- of the Jubba regions. The other Scenario behind this car- bombing , is one in which the Salafist business cartels/Drug-Cartels who were using the port of Kismayo together with Al-Shabaab have seen endangered their interests of exporting charcoal to the  Arab Gulf states in which al-Shabaab and this Salafist cartels were making enormous profits in tandem with the Ras-Kamboni Militia of Ahmed Madobe(  Please read last UN report  on Somalia) and importing Heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan in which they  were re-exporting using Somali Drug-cartels active in Somalia  to Europa,US via the great Horn of Africa countries. This two criminal activities are in danger to be stopped if the agreement/ deal reached in Addis-Ababa came into effect after six months and the Somali government stops the charcoal export and brings its owns Staff and security to the airport and  Kismayo port..Al-Shabaab and the Salafist Business Cartels/Dug-cartels  will loose enormous amounts of millions of Dollars therefore its most likely they have decided to have this car-bombing to scare any involvement which will change the Status Quo. The Third option is Al-Shabaab itself  has seen a window of opportunity in the opposition of this agreement by the majority of clan-communities of the regions and with this car bombing show them their power and capacity  and tell them  that the only way they can get the resources of the regions is to ally themselves with AL-Shabaab-Al-Qaeda. All this options- scenarios are interlinked and have as a base the main alliance of the Salafist Business cartels/Organized crimes groups  and "The Ethiopian intelligence". Al-Shabaab one time is "tool" other time protagonist but never its missing its connections with the Salafist groups/Organized crimes of all over Somalia.Wait and see.

#Somalia: AMISOM,Salfist Cartels,Ethiopia-IGAD All in One.

#Somalia: AMISOM,Salfist Cartels,Ethiopia-IGAD All in One.: There is a Meeting going on at this time at the compound of the Presidency which is the main office of the president and almost all mi...

AMISOM,Salfist Cartels,Ethiopia-IGAD All in One.

There is a Meeting going on at this time at the compound of the Presidency which is the main office of the president and almost all ministers present on what we call "Radical Religious Extremism” in Somalia.. At 500 hundred meters from the meeting place Al-Shabaab explodes this morning ( Saturday 07/09/2013)  a deadly Bomb which kills at least 15 "citizens”. I think the President and his Prime Minister, Ministers must make a honest analysis of the situation and accept the facts that they cannot fight Al-Shabaab without the assistance/cooperation  of Somali citizens and not  with "security services" controlled by Ethiopians-IGAD and sympathizers of Religious Fundamentalism-Extremism. At the meeting live on Somali TVs( even in Nairobi,Eastleigh) were articulate religious arguments by Sheicks, so-called Salafist politicians ,religious scholars, Clan Elders,  who were blaming only "youngsters and few misguided individuals"  for the extremism which have made Somalia "Safe Haven" to Terrorist and Organized crimes/Drug-cartels. There were not any mention of the Structural and Institutional systems which produce, promote, and their supportive Business Cartels companies. The Madrasas , schools, Colleges which have produced hundreds and hundreds of young Somalis ready to be used by terrorist or assist them and are still training Somali youngsters with Curriculums not prepared or supervised, approved by Somali federal government..There were not any mention of the alliance between this groups the Extremist and the Ethiopia-IGAD group who would like to have a week Somali state which must always rely on the assistance and support of the AMISOM armies. President Hassan Sheick, His Prime Minister  and the real friends of Somalia( the US ,EU, Turkey, UK, Arab Nations) must go back to the  drawing board and make clear cut policies to have a clean-security services (armies, police, intelligence) from the infiltration of the Extremist and which can stand for the National Public Interest of Somalia. Why not recruit the Ahlu-Sunna waljameca groups ( not those  allied to Ethiopia?) which are the majority of Somalis and are against this extremist? Why not have a clear policy on  the Somali National federal Agenda and tell the neighboring Nations that a Somalia which is the Save haven of Terror and Organized crimes/Drug-cartels is against the wishes of the Somali people-citizens and cannot be tolerated by Somalis and the international community? To do all this things its needed the intervention and stationing in Somalia of professional soldiers from a Muslim country like Turkey as advisers and mentors  together with the Americans and the Europeans trainers for the Somali security services (Police, Army, Intelligence).The Somali Salafist Business Cartels/Organized Crimes must came to realize that they alliance with Amisom and Ethiopia is unsustainable and could not be implemented. They are the ones who are giving Al-shahaab the support base and using it as "Tool" to destabilize Somalia till they reach their goal to subdivide Somalia in Clan-Enclaves and control its national resources like OIL and GAS
with their ally Ethiopia-IGAD countries. They need a week Somali state which is corrupt, mismanaged( till know there is not even a national tax code or a any taxation paid by this groups who own the entire Somali economy) ,which do not have any economic public sector even health and education must be under their control as its now. The real friends of Somalia must have a concerted plan for Somalia. The honest elites cannot have a voice and the Somali commoner is not consulted. Only so-called clan advocates and Salafist Business Cartels have the capacity to influence and direct the Somali policies. Wait and see.

In ka badan 15-qof oo ku dhintay Qaraxyo Ismiidaamin ahaa oo goor-dhow ka dhacay barxad weyn oo...

hiiraan.com

Sabti, September 07, 2013 (HOL) — Qaraxyo ismiidaamin ah oo xooggan ayaa ka dhacay barxadda iskaashatooyinka oo kasoo horjeedda dhismaha ex-fiyoore oo ku dhow maqaayadda Village oo horay qaraxyo ismiidaamin ah ay uga dhaceen.

#Somalia: VISION 2016: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS.( By S...

#Somalia: VISION 2016: PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS.( By S...: VISION 2016: PRINCIPLES AND  RECOMMENDATIONS.                   Sept.2-6-2013-Mogadishu Somalia. Preamble: The Vision 2016 Confe...