Last UN Security Council Resolution on Somalia.Wait and see.

The Security Council today extended the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to 31 October 2014, requesting the African Union to increase the troop strength of that regional peacekeeping body from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel as part of overall efforts to combat the increasingly asymmetrical tactics of Al-Shabaab rebels in the country.

Unanimously adopting resolution 2124 (2013) under the Charter’s Chapter VII, the 15-member body also expanded the logistical support package for AMISOM for a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 October 2014. It agreed with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia were not yet appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, taking note of benchmarks for such efforts outlined in his 14 October letter (document S/2013/606).

By other terms, the Council underlined that increases in force strength were to provide enhancement of AMISOM’s military capacity for 18 to 24 months, and further, were part of the Mission’s overall exit strategy, after which a decrease in force strength would be considered. It agreed with the Secretary-General on the critical need for sourcing contingent-owned equipment, including force enablers and multipliers, either from existing AMISOM troop contributors or other States, citing the particular need for up to 12 military helicopters. It encouraged Member States to respond in that regard.

Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General to work with the African Union to improve by 1 January 2014 the strategic management of AMISOM by strengthening command and control structures, the coordination of contingents, joint operations with the Somali National Army (SNA) and information management.

As for Somali institutions, the Council requested the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM to provide – as exceptional support — food, water, fuel, transport, tents and “in-theatre” medical evacuation to front-line units of the Somali National Army, the funding for which would be provided from an appropriate United Nations trust fund.

Regarding United Nations personnel, the Council took note of the Secretary-General’s intention to deploy a guard force to strengthen security at the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). It requested details on its deployment “as soon as possible” and emphasized, in that context, the importance of AMISOM’s protection of Mogadishu International Airport Compound within the troop ceiling. On the political front, it urged increased collaboration among the African Union, United Nations and Somali Government towards a comprehensive approach to peace, security and development.

Speaking after adoption, the representative of the Russian Federation said he had voted in favour of the resolution to support African Union efforts in fostering settlement in Somalia, based on the key role that its mission had played in that regard. However, some of his Government’s concerns had not been borne in mind. He was seriously concerned by the wording in paragraph 21, which outlined the Somali Government’s requirement to provide full access to humanitarian organizations, which ran counter to the principles of humanitarian assistance.

He went on to say that the Federal Government was not in a position to control a significant part of the country and that humanitarian organizations were leaving Somalia not because they had been hindered by the Government, but rather, because of the security situation. In establishing humanitarian principles, the Council was getting into an area not covered by its remit — standard setting, which was covered by the General Assembly. Therefore, he did not consider the wording in paragraph 21 as setting a precedent.

The representative of Somalia said that, over the last year, the important parts of his country’s six-pillar policy had been implemented. While the Council had “sustained” Somalia for a long time, there was now a light at the end of the tunnel. Its partnership in support of critical priorities was at a turning point. Indeed, the Council had noted the achievements of AMISOM to liberate Somalia from the scourge of Al-Shabaab, as well as the assistance and training that had enabled his Government to liberate the residual components of that group.

He went on to express hope that the Somali Army contingent fighting with AMISOM to defeat Al-Shabaab would be supported in a more consistent and timely manner by the United Nations, raising questions over when resources from the United Nations trust fund would arrive. AMISOM had been given 18 to 24 months to complete its mandate and he wondered if the trust fund would allow Somali armed forces to liberate the country in enough time for preparations for elections in 2015-2016 to proceed. All means should be applied to ensure those funds arrived as soon as possible. "Otherwise it will be a disaster for Somalia once again," he cautioned.

The meeting began at 10:10 a.m. and ended at 10:25 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2124 (2013) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation in Somalia, in particular resolutions 2036 (2012), 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

“Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia,

“Taking note of the Joint African Union (AU)-United Nations Mission on the benchmarks for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia and their assessment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Security Forces, and underlining the importance it attaches to greater peace, prosperity and stability in Somalia,

“Taking note of the AU Peace and Security Council’s 10 October Communiqué on the Joint AU-United Nations Review of AMISOM and the benchmarking exercise, and welcoming in particular its call to all AU Member States to contribute financially to AMISOM,

“Welcoming the constructive manner in which both the Secretariat and the AU conducted the joint review,

“Underlining its gratitude for the work of AMISOM, in particular the extraordinary sacrifices made by AMISOM forces and personnel in pursuit of peace in Somalia,

“Welcoming the support of the international community to peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM, and emphasizing the importance of new contributors sharing the financial burden of supporting AMISOM,

“Noting with appreciation recent high-level events on Somalia which have generated substantial pledges of support, and underlining the importance of delivering on any support pledged at these events,

“Condemning recent Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, which serve to undermine the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and expressing its solidarity with the people and Governments of Somalia and the region,

“Expressing serious concern at the Secretary-General’s assessment in his
14 October letter to the Security Council that recent security gains against Al‑Shabaab are at serious risk of being reversed, and noting that the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM have now assumed a more defensive posture,

“Noting the Secretary-General’s assessment that there is an urgent need to resume and strengthen the military campaign against Al Shabaab, which requires an enhancement of international support to the Somali National Security Forces and to AMISOM,

“Noting the Secretary-General’s assessment that a comprehensive strategy that includes political, economic and military components is needed to reduce the asymmetrical threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations,

AMISOM

“1. Decides to authorize the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013), until 31 October 2014, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate;

“2. Agrees with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia are not yet appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, takes note of the benchmarks for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation as set out in the Secretary-General’s 14 October letter, and endorsed in the 11 October letter of the AU Commission Chairperson, and requests that the Secretary-General keeps progress against the benchmarks under continuous review, in consultation with the AU, and with a view to creating conducive conditions for the potential deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and the hand-over of security responsibilities to national authorities;

“3. Requests the AU to increase AMISOM’s force strength from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel as set out in the Secretary-General’s 14 October letter;

“4. Decides to expand the logistical support package for AMISOM, referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 2093 (2013), for a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 October 2014, ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of the United Nations funds as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1910 (2010), and consistent with the requirements of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy;

“5. Underlines that, in line with the Joint United Nations-AU Review of AMISOM, the increases in the force strength decided in this resolution are to provide a short-term enhancement of AMISOM’s military capacity, for a period of 18 to 24 months and as part of an overall exit strategy for AMISOM, after which a decrease in AMISOM’s force strength will be considered;

“6. Agrees with the Secretary-General on the critical need for sourcing contingent owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012) either from existing AMISOM Troop-Contributing Countries or other Member States, emphasizes in particular the need for an appropriate aviation component of up to twelve military helicopters, and encourages Member States to respond to AU efforts to mobilize such equipment;

“7. Reiterates paragraphs 5 of resolution 2093 (2013) regarding logistical support to AMISOM;

“8. Further reiterates paragraph 13 of resolution 2093 (2013) on the strengthening of women and children’s protection in AMISOM operations and activities;

“9. Requests the Secretary-General to work closely with the AU in order to support the implementation of this resolution, in particular by improving efficiency in the planning and strategic management of AMISOM, including strengthening command and control structures, the operational coordination of contingents, joint operations with the SNA, and information management, through a new Concept of Operations by 1 January 2014, with a view to enabling AMISOM to respond to the increasingly asymmetrical tactics used by Al-Shabaab, through an effective resumption of the military campaign against Al-Shabaab, which would rapidly reduce its capacity to control key strategic locations, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the AU in the planning, deployment and management of AMISOM through the United Nations office to the AU, and reiterates its request to the Secretary-General, in view of the substantial increases in AMISOM capabilities and support to the SNA, to enhance the provision of technical advice to the AU through existing United Nations mechanisms;

“10. Requests the AU to advance efforts to implement a system to address allegations of misconduct, which includes clear mechanisms for receiving and tracking allegations, as well as for following up with troop-contributing countries on the results of the investigations and disciplinary actions taken as applicable, and requests the United Nations to redouble its efforts to advise and provide guidance to the AU in this endeavour;

“11. Reiterates its request, and that of the AU Peace and Security Council, for AMISOM to develop further an effective approach to the protection of civilians, and stresses in particular the urgent need for AMISOM to establish and use a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell, as requested in resolution 2093 (2013);

“12. Underlines the importance of AMISOM abiding by all requirements applicable to it under international human rights and humanitarian law, further underlines in particular the need for AMISOM to ensure that any detainees in their custody, including disengaged combatants, are treated in strict compliance with applicable obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, including ensuring their humane treatment and further requests AMISOM to allow appropriate access to detainees by a neutral body, and to establish Standard Operating Procedures for the handover of any detainees, including children, who come into their custody during a military operation;

“13. Reiterates its call for new donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment, technical assistance and uncaveated funding for AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, and underlines the AU’s call for their Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM;

Somali federal security institutions

“14. Takes note of the Secretary-General’s recommendation of the need to provide targeted support to front line units of the Somali National Army (SNA), requests UNSOA to support the SNA through the provision of food and water, fuel, transport, tents and in theatre medical evacuation, decides that this exceptional support shall be provided only for joint SNA operations with AMISOM and which are part of AMISOM’s overall Strategic Concept, further decides that funding for this support will be provided from an appropriate United Nations trust fund, and encourages Member States to make uncaveated contributions to the trust fund;

“15. Underlines that the support outlined in paragraph 14 of this resolution must be in full compliance with the United Nations Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), further underlines its expectation that the Secretary-General will report on all UNSOA support to the SNA including on the implementation of the HRDDP, and also requests AMISOM to use its Civilian Casualties Tracking Analysis and Response cell as part of its reporting on joint AMISOM operations with the SNA;

“16. Underlines that all forces supported by UNSOA shall act in compliance with the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), and in that context further underlines its expectation that the Federal Government of Somalia will give its assurance to the Security Council, including in writing, that any Government forces being supported by UNSOA on joint operations with AMISOM will act in compliance with the HRDDP, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

“17. Requests that to assist UNSOM to fulfil its mission, the Head of UNSOA shall keep the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed on the implementation of the AMISOM support package, and further requests the Secretary-General to include this information in his regular reporting to the Security Council;

“18. Calls upon the Federal Government of Somalia to continue its efforts, with the support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), AMISOM (in accordance with their respective mandates), and other international partners to strengthen the Somali National Security Forces including by mapping the structure of these forces, establishing clear command and control systems, implementing appropriate procedures, codes of conduct and training including to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment and finalizing and implementing a national program for the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants and promoting respect for human rights, including through implementing the relevant Somali Government action plans on children and armed conflict;

“19. Further requests UNSOM, in accordance with its mandate, to continue to assist in the rebuilding of Somali security institutions, and reiterates in particular UNSOM’s role in providing strategic policy advice on security sector reform (SSR) and assisting the Federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international donor support on SSR;

“20. Requests UNSOM, working closely with the AU, to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in developing broad principles on the nature of policing in Somalia with a view to proposing further options to support the development of an effective police force in Somalia;

“21. Requests the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure the protection and well-being of all internally displaced persons, including from sexual violence and exploitation, paying particular attention to ensuring that the human rights of internally displaced persons in Somalia are respected in relation to relocations, and to ensure a fully consultative process, providing prior notice and ensuring safe, sanitary new sites that have basic services, as well as full, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations;

Security of United Nations personnel

“22. Takes note of the Secretary-General’s intention to deploy an appropriate United Nations Static Guard unit to strengthen security at UNSOM compounds, looks forward to receiving further details of its deployment as outlined in the Secretary-General’s 14 October letter as soon as possible, and strongly emphasizes the importance of AMISOM’s protection of Mogadishu International Airport Compound within the troop ceiling authorized in this resolution;

Political process

“23. Urges increased collaboration between the AU, United Nations and Federal Government of Somalia, including on a comprehensive approach to peace, security and development which integrates political, security, peacebuilding and development activities, recognizing that none can succeed in isolation;

“24. Recalls its 13 September 2013 statement welcoming the agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Interim Jubba Administration, emphasizes the importance of all parties ensuring that the timelines as stipulated in the agreement are met, and further emphasizes the importance of the Federal Government of Somalia ensuring the right political conditions are in place to ensure greater peace and stability in Somalia;

“25. Welcomes in this context the efforts undertaken by the Federal Government of Somalia to consolidate security and establish the rule of law in areas secured by AMISOM and the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and encourages it to continue to lead an inclusive national dialogue, with the support of UNSOM, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the AU to clarify and settle relations between the Federal government of Somalia and existing and emerging local administrations and initiate processes of national reconciliation in order to accelerate efforts to establish sustainable, legitimate and representative local governance structures across the country, especially in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab;

“26. Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to finalize and adopt a federal Constitution by December 2015, to prepare for and hold credible elections in 2016; and to ensure the equitable participation of women, youth, minority groups and other marginalized groups in national political processes;

“27. Further encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to implement its “Vision 2016” agenda which sets out the importance of a Somali-owned, inclusive, and transparent political process and economic recovery, consistent with the Provisional Constitution and including an effective federal political system and a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration;

Sanctions

“28. Expresses concern at continuing violations of the Security Council charcoal ban requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to raise awareness amongst relevant Member States on their requirements to abide by the charcoal ban, as set out in resolution 2036 (2012);

“29. Underlines the importance of the Federal Government of Somalia and Member States complying with all aspects of the arms embargo, including the reporting and notification requirements set out in resolution 2111 (2013);

Reporting

“30. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of all aspects of this resolution as part of his regular reporting to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia;

31. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.” 

Somali news leader 
www.jowhar.com 
jowharcom@hotmail.com 
golfyare@gmail.com

Hanad on November 14 2013

#Somalia: Why Yussur Abraar resigned from Governor of Centra...

#Somalia: Why Yussur Abraar resigned from Governor of Centra...:   The case of Madam YusurAbraar the Central Bank Governor resigning after seven weeks on the Job is one of the worst Scandals happened to ...

Why Yussur Abraar resigned from Governor of Central Bank and the endemic/systematic corruption of Somalia (Part 1). Wait and see.

  The case of Madam YusurAbraar the Central Bank Governor resigning after seven weeks on the Job is one of the worst Scandals happened to the government of President Hassan Sheik. In the more developed democracies were the concept of transparency and accountability is the cornerstone of the “workings” of governance this would have prompted the resignation of the Minister of Finance or even higher up in government. We all know that Somalia is one of the most corrupt Nations on Earth and that corruption is what we “ call the Norm rather than the Exception”. But even knowing all this does not make us forgiving or understand how on earth Ministers and directors of the Presidency  linked to Damu Jadid  pro-Salafist group  can think they can steal “Public money” with “Impunity” with a total disregard to the Public good and the National Public interest. I had a hope and still have that President Hassan Sheik will reign on the Big grand scale acts of Corruption and will accept the small amounts being almost impossible to control this culture of corruption and mismanagement.
       I believe that the acts of corruption on large or small are acts are “existential treats “against the promotion and the National Institution Building of our failed State and reestablishment of Our nation-State”. This type of corruption I always asserted is part of the game plans of the Ethiopians and their  ally the IGAD countries to say Somalis cannot be a viable state and must be re-colonized by the regional powers and made Clan-Enclaves controlled by those powers. How on Earth sums in the millions of Dollars can be  attempted to be swindled  by this Ruling Elites with Total disregard of the sufferings of the people-citizens?  Some will say that the former Presidents and governments have all been corrupt/mismanaged  and stealing of public money on large scale is a “normal business”  therefore there is not any difference between this new government of President Hassan Sheik and the past governments starting from 2004.
       We Somalis in General  and those in  the Diaspora, the international community and even of those “not corrupt elites” in Mogadishu we were hoping the “business as usual “of stealing public money will diminish to a manageable level  and the Government will treat corruption and mismanagement  as equal to “Terrorism” and being against the National Public interests. In other words equal to the fight against #AlShabaab and being labeled as Traitor to the Nation. No way. Still Ministers especially those in the Presidency are behaving like nothing has changed and the Culture of Impunity is the only thing they Know not the Law or any other punishment against their persona for the criminal acts they commit while they are in office.
       There is the story going around in the Internet that those who tried to convince Yussur Abraar to take part in a big scam to defraud the Somali government of Millions of Dollars  and intimidated her after she refused their plans were “ close members of the President family” and a business man from South Africa of the same sub-clan. For me it’s not important who are his persons but the act itself of trying/ attempting  with a high ranking officer of the Government is itself a crime and this happens everybody knows that there will never be punished and brought to justice for the crimes of attempting to stealing Public money. Till this persons are brought in front of a judge and sentenced “beyond reasonable doubt” they are innocent” but in Somalia nobody is prosecuted for attempting/stealing Public money. I can only remember the case of two district commissioners of Mogadishu who after they have stolen food Aid worth Thousands of Dollars where pardoned by the former President even after they were sentenced and found guilty by a Court of Law.
       This will continue to happen all over Somalia including the Regions of Somaliland and Puntland for this following reasons: 1)the absence of the Rule of Law in the administration of the “State public affairs”. 2) The Total absence of norms of Transparency and Accountability in the running of the Public administration.3) The believe that the  President, Ministers will never be punished and brought to justice because they know and everybody knows that they are the Kings of the Land( Regions)  and they will never be brought to account for their crimes. In other words the Culture of Impunity is supreme in all aspects of Governance.4) The international community I mean the West and UN have always been part of this High scale corruption/mismanagement in the last 23 years and in some instances’ it looks they even encouraged it when it came to the workings of NGOs (local and international including those who say are “religious based” including the Muslim ones) who stole millions of Dollars with their Somali managers and collusion of International Staff. In Somalia in the popular parlance they call “NGOs Culture” and “behavior” the acts to steal pubic money. And the individuals who were managers, worked for NGOs are at the forefront of this government as Ministers.5) The State in all its forms be Regional or Federal is seen as a “Milking cow to make money “in the popular culture and not a service to the Nation or a Public property. If this Kind of Culture is not changed and nothing is done to Change the cultural/political  perception and the Legal workings of the State, the same existence of the Somali Nationhood/State will be in Danger in the future. The Salafist Business cartels that control the totality of the Somali economy have as a policy that the existence/practice of a week government which is corrupt and mismanaged is in their Best interest. In that way the state is controlled by this Salafist groups and will never fulfill its Role of defender/promoter  of the interests of the People-citizens and Somali National Interests but the promoter of the Salafist Agenda within the State.(please read “Who are Business people of Somalia?” in my blog wardigley.blogspot.com).
        There are other groups who are allied with the Salafist Business cartels mainly the “Organized crimes” groups  which are mostly are Salafist but their business are mainly about “expired Food stuff”, “expired medicines”, “Expired general products” etc, Human Trafficking and all this is done all over the greater Horn of Africa/East /Central Africa. The Other group is the “Drug-Cartels” who import to Somalia “Heroin” from Afghanistan and Indian Sub-Continent including Pakistan. This Drugs are then Exported to East Africa/Central Africa and re-exported to US and Europe, Middle East.

       Who are the groups who benefit from this Corruption? First what is the Role of The Salafist Business cartels in the Corruption/mismanagement of the Somalia State (It’s included in my analysis the regional authorities of Somaliland and Puntalnd. Everything I say concerning the corruption and Organized crimes/Drug Cartels groups is similar in all over Somalia). What are the Role of Organized crimes groups and the Drug cartels in this corruption based “governance” of the Somali State? What is the Role of these groups in the Government machinery? What is the role of The Ethiopian Intelligence and the Somali-Elites-Organized crimes/Drug-cartels groups Trojan horses in the Government,and those who represent the Ethiopian interest? How they have become corrupted (or they were before they came to Somalia) the Armies of the Countries in Amisom? What is the Role of Amisom in the corruption/Mismanagement of the “Cosa Publica” of Somalia? I will try to answer these very sensitive questions which are also at the core of the issues of corruption and mismanagement in Somalia.After I will  dwell on how to   Stem/stop the Illegal drugs flow to somalia and the Organiozed crimes groups hold on part of Somali economy.( It will be in Part.2 ( to be continued).


#Somalia: WHY Dr abiy AHMED WENT TO MOGADISHU? FOR OIL & GAS...

#Somalia: WHY Dr abiy AHMED WENT TO MOGADISHU? FOR OIL & GAS... : INTRODUCTION:            On 16 June MR. Abiy  Ahmed PM of Ethiopia ...