#Somalia: How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya.By Dai...

#Somalia: How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya.By Dai...: How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya A survivor of the 1998 terror attack in Nairobi is removed from ground zero. Photo/FILE  ...

How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya.By Daily Nation 28 October 2013.

How Al-Qaeda agents brought terror to Kenya

A survivor of the 1998 terror attack in Nairobi is removed from ground zero. Photo/FILE 

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Monday, October 28, 2013

For five years, the terrorists stayed with us, masquerading as businessmen, tourists, and charity workers. Behind the scenes, they plotted murder.

On the morning of August 7, 1998, two vehicles drove out of house number 43 in Nairobi’s New Runda Estate.

The lead pick-up was driven by Fazul Mohammed, also known as Harun, while the second, a Toyota Dyna, which was carrying a bomb, was driven by Jihad Mohammed Ali (aka Azzam), with Mohammed Rashid Daoud Al-Owhali in the passenger’s seat.

The day had come…

The Al-Qaeda group, then headed by Osama bin Laden, had established its operations in Kenya in 1993 when they registered a business in Nairobi under Asma Limited.

It was registered by Khalid Fawwaz, who later transferred it to Al-Qaeda military commander, Abu al Banshiri. They also registered another business known as Tanzanite King.

Using this cover, the group started laying strategy on how to retaliate against the US its participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

Asma Limited was supposed to carry out export-import business but the Al-Qaeda members were cash-strapped after hiring the Nairobi office, forcing them to sell the furniture and other fittings.

It was the entry of Mohammed Sadeek Odeh in 1994 that was to change the fate of the terror group in Kenya.

Odeh arrived in Mombasa and received the group’s military commanders and trainers, Muhamed Atef and Banshiri. They presented a six-foot, seven-tonne fibre-glass fishing boat to Odeh. It was to become the lifeline of the Kenyan cell.

Another arrival through Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport was an American jihadist known as Wadih El Haji, masquerading as a precious stones dealer.

'HELP AFRICA PEOPLE'

He opened a new business in Nairobi, Tanzanite King. El Haji, a Lebanese-American who travelled on a US passport, was to become Osama bin Laden’s main contact in East Africa.

Known as “The Manager” within the Kenyan cell, El Haji was a graduate of the University of Louisiana.

His entry was to facilitate the registration of another camouflage, a non-governmental organisation, Help Africa People, which was to be used as the official Al-Qaeda cover in Kenya.

His deputy was Fazul, a Comorian who would lead the bombing truck on the morning of August 7.

Help Africa People had been registered in Germany and it gave Fazul the best cover in Kenya. Unknown to many, Fazul had in 1993 been involved in the downing of two US Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu, forcing the US to pull its troops out of Somalia.

Fazul returned to the Comoros briefly and married a girl he had never met before, 17-year-old Halima, a madrasa student.

Three weeks later he entered Kenya as Harun Fazul together with his new wife and hired an apartment in Nairobi.

With the boat, Asma Limited, and the NGO in place, the group started arming itself with bomb-building components. They established code names for them — TNT and detonator cords were known as “tools”, hand grenades were “potatoes”, while fake travel documents were known as “goods”.

In 1994, Al-Qaeda sent another operative, Mustafa Ahmed, to open yet another company, the Nairobi branch of bin Laden’s Taba Investment Company, which was then operating in Tanzania.

Odeh and Mustafa established themselves as fish suppliers and conducted booming business with leading restaurants and hotels. Odeh was referred to as “Mohammed, the fisherman,” and he loved it.

Meanwhile, Fazul moved his wife to Khartoum, which allowed him to move between Nairobi, Khartoum ,and Mogadishu with ease using the miraa aircraft transportation network.

He was the least of suspects. He was working for an NGO and, unknown to the security forces, the cell had links to another NGO, Mercy International Relief Agency, run by Safar al Hawali, and the Nairobi branch of Haramayn Foundation.

With all these contacts, Fazul managed to ferry cash to members of the cells with ease. On the ground, his NGO’s mission was to deliver emergency humanitarian aid — food, medicine, clothing, and shelter — to people in need.

Odeh, a Palestinian from Jordan, was firmly settled in Mombasa in the fishing business, Fazul was in Nairobi as an NGO manager, while El Haji was a gemstone dealer with an office in Nairobi and also working with Mercy International.

NECESSARY BACK-UP

Two Al-Qaeda commanders based in the region, Muhammed Atef and Abu al Banshiri, gave the group the necessary back-up.

In 1996, El Haji, the gemstone dealer and the fishing boat manager, Odeh, transported $7,000 received from bin Laden to Mombasa to kick-start the militarisation of the East African cells.

In Mombasa, Odeh, using the fishing boat as a cover, received the “tools” — TNT and detonators — obtained in Tanzania from the Mombasa-born Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam, a senior figure in the cell.

The fishing boat business allowed Odeh to frequent the coast of Tanzania from Somalia, selling other people’s catches.

Odeh was well trained. Born in Saudi Arabia, he had studied engineering at the Far Eastern University in the Philipines, where he was active in Islamic activities and listened to video lectures of Abdullah Azzam, the man who coined the term Al-Qaeda (meaning “The Base”) and the spiritual mentor of bin Laden.

Odeh quit university in his final year, went to Afghanistan to join Mujahideen, and underwent military training before he was sent to Somalia by bin Laden to help clan leader, Mohammed Farah Aideed, who was waging war against the US marines.

But this acquisition of bomb-making material was slowed down in May 1996 when Abu al Banshiri died while aboard MV Bukoba, the Tanzanian ferry that sunk 56 kilometres off Mwanza, killing more than 1,000 people.

With the death of Banshiri, Fazul became the principal contact for the Kenyan mission and moved to Nairobi, where he lived with El Haji’s family and served as his assistant at the NGO.

Meanwhile in Afghanistan, another man, Rashid Daoud Al-Owhali, had just completed training in explosives, hijacking and kidnaping, assassination, and intelligence techniques.

He was to be sent to Nairobi for the final mission.

With everything set, Osama bin Laden proclaimed a jihad on August 23, 1996, asking Muslims to take up arms against US establishments anywhere in the world.

Fazul got scared and sent an alert, saying the East African cell was “100 per cent endangered”, and complaining that he had heard the news from CNN.

That December 21, 1996, El Haji, the fake gemstone dealer, sent a coded letter to Baku, Azerbaijan, confirming that he had shipped three false passports to persons in Azerbaijan. One was for Al-Owhali to enable him to travel to Kenya to drive the vehicle carrying the bomb.

He then left Nairobi for Pakistan to meet the Al-Qaeda team. That February, 1997, El Haji met with bin Laden and briefed him on the East African cells.

TRIP TO SOMALIA

In March 1997, bin Laden ordered Odeh, the Mombasa-based “fish trader”, to travel to Somalia and assess “the Islamic struggle” in the country and report back.

Odeh stayed there for seven months and returned to Kenya, settling in the tiny village of Witu near the Somalia border, where he set up a small furniture business with his brother-in-law while waiting for the final orders.

Meanwhile, in September 1997, an Al-Qaeda defector, Jamal Ahmed, walked into the Nairobi US embassy to report that seven men working for a local NGO had connections with bin Laden.

The CIA thought the intelligence was of little value and only asked the Kenyan Government to deport the group.

A night raid was carried out but the assembled documents did not give leads to any impending attack. Nothing was done.

That November, another man, an Egyptian named Mustafa Ahmed, sought an appointment with the US embassy in Nairobi and informed the officials there that a group of terrorists based in Kenya were planning to car-bomb the embassy.

After questioning the man, the CIA concluded that he was lying but asked ambassador Prudence Bushnell to seek additional security.

She wrote to Washington but her request was disregarded.

During this period, the CIA raided El Haji’s home, seeking to seize digital and paper data.

But Fazul, who was staying with El Haji, had managed to cart away most of the files and those seized were on the NGO’s activities — distribution of mosquito nets, water tanks, and drugs.

Fazul left for Sudan, hoping to watch the developing situation. There was another raid at the Haramayn Foundation with zero success and luckily for the terrorists, nobody followed up and the investigations were dropped, allowing Fazul to return.

His top priority was to buy a vehicle to deliver the bombs and rent safe houses to build them. Time was running out. With the help of a Mr Sikander Juma, he rented Runda House number 43, a secure villa with a high wall, in May, 1998, just three months to the D-Day.

The property owner, Tamarra Ratemo, was told that Fazul wanted to settle his family and guests. Unknown to the landlord, this was to be the bomb factory and Fazul’s family lived with Sikander Juma and at times in El Haji’s house elsewhere in Nairobi.

Eleven months before the bombings, El Haji had quietly moved from Nairobi to Arlington, Texas, leaving the operations in the hands of Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah alias Saleh, also known as Abu Mariam.

The Runda house was perfect. It had four bedrooms, three baths, and a garage suited for bomb-building.

Fazul, aka Harun, moved in with his wife and two children and purchased a beige-coloured Toyota Dyna truck and, using another smaller pick-up, he started moving the bomb-building materials to Runda, some concealed in boxes of lobsters.

At the Runda garage, Fazul supervised the construction of two massive, one-tonne devises made of about 500 cylinders of TNT, fertiliser, and aluminium powder.

Abdel Rahman was taken to Runda to do the electrical work after KK Mohammed had completed the assembly work.

Meanwhile, on August 1, 1998, Abu Mariam, the key Al-Qaeda commander in East Africa, issued an order to all Al-Qaeda personnel in Kenya to leave the country by August 6.

The attacks were scheduled for the next day. The US embassy at the junction of Moi and Haile Selassie avenues was vulnerable. The targeted basement parking was manned by an unarmed guard and a manually operated drop bar.

The Saturday before the attack, Odeh, the fisherman, met with Ally Msalam, who ordered him to “get out of here!”

In the final days, Odeh had become unreliable and broke. He did not even have money for an air ticket and his passport had expired.

A Yemeni passport was stolen for him and he was asked to go and see someone at the immigration office in Mombasa with his photo.

On August 2, the proposed bomber arrived at Nairobi’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and took a taxi to Ramada Hotel in Eastleigh, where he booked Room 24.

He called someone in Pakistan to confirm his arrival. That day, Fazul drove to Ramada and picked up his guest. He paid the bills even though the guest had not stayed overnight. They both left for Runda.

Meanwhile, Odeh was under pressure to leave the country. Ally Msalam on Monday, August 3, secured Odeh’s travel papers from immigration, secured an airline ticket, and asked him to meet the group at Nairobi’s Hilltop Hotel for final directions.

Another arrival in Nairobi that week from Afghanistan was Jihad Mohammed Ali “Azzam”, who was also now at the Runda villa.

Here, Abu Mariam gave the final instructions to Fazul, Azzam, and Al-Owhali. Azzam would drive the bomb vehicle following Fazul, who would show him the way to the American embassy while Al-Owhali would be the passenger.

Armed with a pistol, Al-Owhali was supposed to scare the guard to raise the drop bar to allow Azzam to drive as close to the building as possible — or to the underground parking. He was to also scare Kenyans from the scene by throwing grenades.

At the Hilltop Hotel, the final base for the terrorists, Odeh checked into Room 102b using the fake Yemeni passport. He held a final meeting with four other members — Ally Msalam, Fazul, and Huseein.

FINAL BASE FOR TERRORISTS

They were all to meet in Afghanistan in a week’s time. Odeh, who looked scared of travelling, was forced to shave his beard and given some cologne and cigarettes to make him look like a westernised traveller.

On August 4, Ally Msalam, Fazul, and the bombers went round the embassy building for final surveillance, and did so for the next two days.

They were later dropped at Runda and that night Ally Msalam flew out of Kenya. Odeh was the last to leave and generally unprepared. At 10pm on the night of August 6, he boarded a Pakistani International Airlines flight.

The next morning, Al-Owhali, dressed in black shoes, blue jeans, white short-sleeved shirt, and a blue cotton jacket, put four stun grenades on his belt and a 9mm Bereta pistol in his jacket pocket.

With Azzam, they boarded the Toyota Dyna — the bomb vehicle. Fazul noticed that Al-Owhali’s jacket was concealing the pistol and ordered him to remove it to enable him to reach the grenades faster.

As Azzam approached the drop bar, Al-Owhali alighted to go and scare the guard, but halfway, he realised that his pistol was in the jacket, which he had left in the truck.

He threw a grenade at the guard, who took off, leaving the drop bar down. Azzam drove parallel to the embassy as Al-Owhali pondered what to do. He pressed the button. A deafening blast rocked Nairobi.

Al-Owhali was not dead. He walked to a nearby clinic that was treating victims, but realised that he still had a stun grenade in his belt. Unnoticed, he put it in a trash bin.

He was then taken by an ambulance to MP Shah Hospital, where he registered as Khalid Salim and had his forehead cut stitched.

He was discharged but as he reached into his pocket, he realised that he still had three bullets and key to the padlock that had locked the back door of the bomb truck.

He returned to the hotel and tried to flush them down the toilet. He hid them inside a window ledge when that failed. He thought he could walk to Runda but he did not know the direction.

Since he was supposed to die in the bomb truck, he had not carried his passport (it was still in Runda) and money.

At the hotel, the booking clerk brought a Yemeni to help him. He got new clothes and threw the bloodied ones in the dustbin.

Meanwhile in Karachi, the news of the Nairobi bombing was on all channels.

Odeh managed to slip through immigration but an observant officer realised that the man in the passport had a beard, unlike Odeh who had been ordered to shave it off in Nairobi. Odeh tried to bribe the officer and he was asked: “Are you a terrorist running away from Nairobi?” He was arrested. Al-Owhali was also arrested in Nairobi and they started to spill the beans.

#Somalia: Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility.B...

#Somalia: Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility.B...: Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility by Mohamud M Uluso Friday, October 27, 2013 The opinion piece of renowned Som...

Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility.By Mohamed M.Ulusso.

Somalia’s Leaders pledged to end state fragility

by Mohamud M Uluso
Friday, October 27, 2013

The opinion piece of renowned Somali born novelist, professor Nuruddin Farah, published on the opinion pages of October 14 New York Times, under the title Somalia's Leader: Look Past the Hype, recycles the bashing lines that few Somali politicians fallen from grace with the people of Somalia have been throwing at president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for quite some time for self-serving aims. The piece trumps up political allegations while it dismisses the truths and contexts. Surprisingly, the professor, contrary to what expected from an enlightened person like him, has lowered himself by owing and circulating hearsay stories he doubts their truthfulness.  

Sadly, by stating that “President Mohamud didn’t have the determination to lead the country, nor the hardiness to stand up to clan elders who have contributed to the two decade civil war and still dominate the country,”, which seems overboard assertion, the professor nurtures the bad culture he warned against, which is “Somalis are notorious for their petty mindedness, tendency to focus on their grievances and constant warring.” The sum of the implicitly singled out clan elders and their followers, the great number of political panhandlers and their peers, the terrorist and piracy groups and their associates, and the pervasive culture of petty mindedness will leave Somalia with no good people.

While the government has the responsibility to explain the case of the killer of the staff members of Doctors Without Borders released by appellate judges, all other allegations crammed in the piece are personal attacks to defeat good policies beneficial for all Somalis. The allegations include the claim of loss  of credibility among the Troop Contributing Countries of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)-probably intended for Kenya, the disputed Central Bank fleecing, professor Ahmed Ismail Samater’s frivolous complain of losing the presidential election for vote buying, and Dr. Ali Khalif Galleyr’s preposterous allegation that unnamed British and American intelligence sources linked president Hassan to Al Shabab- a terrorist group bent to destroy any Somali government- and finally the demand for the prosecution of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys for terrorism in difference to his allies now hailed as heroes. In conclusion, Professor Nuruddin appeals to the West to end its darling of President Hassan, and particularly to the Time Magazine to re-evaluate its claim that president Hassan as one of the 100 most influential people in the world.

First, as background, in 2006, upon the request of undisclosed but maybe now identifiable member of the defunct Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Professor Nuruddin had extensive discussions with Sheikh Hassan Aweys and other leaders during his failed mediation mission between the ICU and the former Transitional Federal Government of President Abdullahi Yusuf. In the opinion piece titled My Life as Diplomat published in the New York Times on May 26, 2007, the professor didn’t hide his distaste towards Sheikh Hassan Aweys.  

Second, according to Professor Ahmed I. Samater’s admission, the abysmal failure of his presidential ambition was not principally due to money but to many other factors including strong doubt about his leadership as a Somali politician and the genuineness of his slogans, later confirmed by his sudden political conversion. Third, the pitiful leadership performances of former Prime Ministers were sufficient to take their allegations with grain of salt.

Among the 2012 presidential candidates, President Hassan was one of the most qualified presidential candidates in terms of character, education, good understanding of domestic problems and international geopolitics. He pledged to focus on establishing  the foundations of the Somali State, neglected by the preceding transitional governments. That doesn’t mean that president Hassan’s leadership is without major political mistakes but the allegations in the piece are idle talk (fadhi ku dirir) stories.

The major source of the on-going political tension in Somalia is due to the clash between the clan rivalries fueled by yet to be defined federal system and the urgent need for a national integration under the rule of law for ending state fragility. The performance of the Somali government depends on many factors, including nationalistic leadership, the overcoming of the civil war bitterness and Somali elite egocentricity, and check on foreign interventions.

After more than two decades of statelessness for civil war and foreign manipulations, the first permanent national representative government, which controls only a fraction of the country, has exceptionally received diplomatic recognition from key international powers. Unfortunately, some have seen this international special treatment as a personal gift to President Hassan rather than seeing it  as an opportunity for the Somali people to collectively own their country and destiny by fostering internal unity despite many differences.

The leaders of the new government pledged to restore and protect the sovereignty, dignity, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Somalia on the basis of not on clan fiefdoms and preferences, but on national strategy founded on decentralized regional administrations connected and loyal to a democratic accountable central authority and not to foreign powers. The stay in state fragility, defined as a country where the government lacks the ability to perform the functions necessary for the security and well-being of the population languishing in poverty, insecurity and hopelessness, is immoral and unacceptable.

Neighboring countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) have diplomatic relations with Somalia but they deliberately ignore the  respect of the principles of equality of states and  no-interference, and are determined to vandalize the gained international diplomatic recognition. As reported by Ethiopian Government’s News bulletin of October 23, Ethiopia establishes a strategic relationship with Somaliland and is proud of the role it played in the endorsement of the Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA) in Brussels with the support of UK and Danish governments. In addition, Ethiopia leads the process of alienating the people in the Jubba regions. These blatant interferences are one of the major challenges facing the Somali government because it fuels internal political instability and loss of legitimacy. The expert witnesses at US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' hearing on the Security and Governance in Somalia, held on October 8, unanimously stressed that the US government should rein in the aggressive intervention of Kenya and Ethiopia in the internal affairs of Somalia to ensure peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.

During the last eight years, the international community spent billions of dollars in the name of Somalia, but the new Government did not inherit: (a) a constitution which ends the country’s fragmentation into clan enclaves; (b) basic public administration structure; (c) an established security forces; (d) credible public record; and (e) national revenue sources except Mogadishu port revenues. Most of the country remained beyond the control of the central government’s legal authority. Nevertheless, some unscrupulous political opponents demand the fulfillment of functions and services beyond the federal government’s capacity for lack of national integration and resources as well as for lack of direct support from the international community. The politically motivated accusations targeted against the president tap the myriads of problems and challenges either left unresolved at their right forums or purposely created by foreign powers to undermine Somalia’s march towards statehood like Jubbaland crisis.

Since the constitution making process of eight years did not resolve the fragmented political power of the country, the role of the federal government remains to support and legitimize the peacemaking efforts of AMISOM forces under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and embrace foreign dictated agenda. However, on September 16, the international community endorsed, in the context of the international engagement with fragile states, a New Deal for Somalia with the pledge of 2.5 billion dollars for 2014-2016. The New Deal is not without dangerous traps.

In general, the goal seems to be to re-establish within three years throughout Somalia the foundations of a Somali State based on the rule of law rather than on clan parochialism. The essential condition for achieving this goal is the unequivocal respect of the federal government’s leadership and immediate fulfillments of theNew Deal pledges. Moreover, the Somali people- government, politicians, religious and community leaders, and elite class- have to set aside the insistence on fractured governance structures and to seize the new opportunity for an integrated system of governance for real peaceful transformation and exit from the fragile situation. The alternative would be a continued polarization and brinkmanship that will hasten the already in progress demise of Somalia, which in turn, will increase regional insecurity.

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Mohamud M. Ulusomohamuduluso@gmail.com-I copied from Hiiraan.com On line to make it Public.

#Somalia: The Criminal motives Behind the Car-Bombing of Ahm...

#Somalia: The Criminal motives Behind the Car-Bombing of Ahm...: If you follow  with keen interest the Murky Somali Politics-an interconnections of Jihadist groups  , Business cartels/Organized crimes/Dru...

The Criminal motives Behind the Car-Bombing of Ahmed Madobe in Kismayo,Somalia.

If you follow  with keen interest the Murky Somali Politics-an interconnections of Jihadist groups  , Business cartels/Organized crimes/Drug-cartels  and Ethiopian intelligence manipulation,plots- you will be puzzled even at the latest assassination attempt on the convoy of Mr. Ahmed Madobe by a suicide car- bomb in the middle of Kismayo town last Thursday Sept 12 /2013  . On 27 August 2013 , before the attempt, there has been  a political deal in Addis-Ababa in which ,strangely the Ethiopian government is guarantor, and  Mr. Ahmed Madobe was recognized by the Somali federal government  as Leader and chairman ( of the executive,legislative and judiciary,Security) of the Jubba administration made of lower Jubba,middle Jubba and Gedo regions. The Somali government got in exchange to be the "sole representative of Somali sovereignty and Nation-State".It was a biased deal which has not taken into account the will of the people of the regions and was not  even made in good faith by the Ethiopians which were directing the whole saga.Also  they were diplomatically told that the Somali government will never accept Subdivision and they have to change their Plans by the international community.Why you would ask? The main reason being that the Ethiopians-Tigre Elites and some of the  Somali-Kenyan establishment,Kenyan Business tycoons  were allied with some groups who were representing Big Oil companies  like Statoil of Norway represented by a former PM and Total oil which was represented by a former Minister of defence,Clan Communities  in this political kaleidoscope of this regions  and  were advocating for an Independent and Sovereign Somali regional state in Jubba regions in a Confederate Somali State.This  new  deal makes Jubba regions Part and Parcel of Somalia but gives exorbitant powers to Mr. Madobe as Leader.This was not good for this groups and they had their own game plans which were are now being  executed by the Ethiopian Intelligence using Al-Shabaab in this car-bombing. First they have putted  in the deal this exorbitant powers of the Leader must not be changed in following negotiations and it must be intact. Secondly they wont " a political and security crisis" in which Mr. Ahmed Madobe will accept their own game- plan and will not accept any negotiation to bring in more clans -communities in the administration  and security services. That is the reason the car- bomb by Al-shabaab was organized by the Ethiopian Intelligence community. My theory has always been that the Ethiopians had contacts within the Al-Shabaab of Ahmed Godane and the Salafist Business cartels which are linked with Al-Shabaab.  Ahnmed Madobe was transported from the airport in a armoured vehicle made of steel  by Amisom while his staff and others travelled in his own car-convoy.The man-Ahmed Madob- will be made to believe in this  pre-planned operation  and accept all the suggestions,game plans  of the Ethiopian intelligence and the Hawks in the Somali clans community,representatives of Oil companies who are against any agreement unless its the recognition of a new sovereign state in South of Somalia.The other motivation  at work its the Ethiopians  would like as stated in the Kampala communique only the Amisom African armies to be stationed in Kismayo without the Re-hatting to UN blue helmets. Therefore with this bombing any UN intervention/deployment  would be scared. More to that at Art. 33 of the Kampala Communique its approved that Amisom and" the Chiefs of Staff of Ethiopia" within the framework of "Amisom Military operations.........to work out the modalities and development of an Amisom Multinational force to deployed to Kismayo". We can see  Ethiopians are back in the security issues and my opinion is they are  against any Multinational force be it African or UN multinational force.Their game plan is to be involved directly in the security issues of the Jubba regions now with  a UN mandate to make legitimate their own security game-plans.With this car-bombing they are telling the world that the place is so dangerous that  they are the Only state who can afford and capable to fight against this dangerous extremism group of Al-Shabaab. All  lies made to confuse and scare the Intentional community and even the Somali government which they hold hostage thanks to IGAD Organization and Amisom Armies. From the timing of the Operation the  car-bomb,the detailed execution,the knowledge of the arrival of Ahmed Madobe,the exact car  to bomb all makes this operation being -pre-planned by the Ethiopians but executed by Al-Shabaab.If you ask me how its possible this Unholy alliance ? First I will direct you to read some of my blogs like " History of the alliance between the Somali Al-Ittixad movement and the Ethiopians" going back to the 80". and other more recent in which I spoke in detail about the strategic  importance for Ethiopia and its backers -China,France, Iran,Italy- of the Jubba regions. The other Scenario behind this car- bombing , is one in which the Salafist business cartels/Drug-Cartels who were using the port of Kismayo together with Al-Shabaab have seen endangered their interests of exporting charcoal to the  Arab Gulf states in which al-Shabaab and this Salafist cartels were making enormous profits in tandem with the Ras-Kamboni Militia of Ahmed Madobe(  Please read last UN report  on Somalia) and importing Heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan in which they  were re-exporting using Somali Drug-cartels active in Somalia  to Europa,US via the great Horn of Africa countries. This two criminal activities are in danger to be stopped if the agreement/ deal reached in Addis-Ababa came into effect after six months and the Somali government stops the charcoal export and brings its owns Staff and security to the airport and  Kismayo port..Al-Shabaab and the Salafist Business Cartels/Dug-cartels  will loose enormous amounts of millions of Dollars therefore its most likely they have decided to have this car-bombing to scare any involvement which will change the Status Quo. The Third option is Al-Shabaab itself  has seen a window of opportunity in the opposition of this agreement by the majority of clan-communities of the regions and with this car bombing show them their power and capacity  and tell them  that the only way they can get the resources of the regions is to ally themselves with AL-Shabaab-Al-Qaeda. All this options- scenarios are interlinked and have as a base the main alliance of the Salafist Business cartels/Organized crimes groups  and "The Ethiopian intelligence". Al-Shabaab one time is "tool" other time protagonist but never its missing its connections with the Salafist groups/Organized crimes of all over Somalia.Wait and see.

#Somalia: AMISOM,Salfist Cartels,Ethiopia-IGAD All in One.

#Somalia: AMISOM,Salfist Cartels,Ethiopia-IGAD All in One.: There is a Meeting going on at this time at the compound of the Presidency which is the main office of the president and almost all mi...